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F or centuries, dem ocratic theorists have been faced w ith the dilem m a o f reconciling
m ajority rule w ith m inority rights. Jam es M adison w restled w ith this dilem m a in
when he participated in the Constitutional Convention in 1789 and later w hen he
penned the Federalist Papers and the V irginia R esolution. Years later, Robert Dahl
studied the sam e issue in his landm ark work, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory. Both
theorists w ere concerned w ith the effects o f groups, w ith high levels o f intense
political participation, on the dem ocratic process. M adison feared that intense
m ajorities w ould abridge the freedom s o f m inority groups or individuals. D ahl feared
that intense m inorities m ight prevent m ajorities from controlling the dem ocratic
process.
This thesis seeks to explain w hy groups, at certain tim es, participate in the political
system w ith high levels o f intensity and at other tim es, do not. R ights are divided into
tw o groups: political rights and econom ic rights. It is argued that econom ic rights
attract higher levels o f intense participation because they are rights w hich exhibit
zero-sum characteristics. Political rights attract less intense participation because
they do not exhibit the characteristics o f rivalry and have a tendency to attract “free
riders”.
The conclusions are that by using an econom ic/political rights paradigm to study the
w ay people react to the allocation or defense o f rights, dem ocratic theorists will be
able to predict w hen intense conflicts will arise. Therefore, rules and institutions
could be created that m ediate intense conflicts by creating non-m ajoritiarian rules
w hen intense conflicts m ight arise.
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CHAPTER 1
IN TR O D U C TIO N
“The Problem o f Intensity o f Econom ic Interests in M ad iso n 's and D ah l's Theory of
D em ocracy”

H istorically and theoretically, dem ocracy is a w ork in progress. Socrates, and
the G reeks, first introduced the w orld to the idea o f dem ocracy. O ver 2000 years
later, theorists such as Jam es M adison, and later Robert Dahl, are still trying to come
to term s w ith what dem ocracy actually m eans. D em ocracy is, at best, an am biguous
concept. Even today, there is only lim ited consensus on w hat characteristics a nation
m ust exhibit in order to be labeled a dem ocracy.
In one sense, dem ocracy is a process. H ow ever, the w orld’s understanding of
dem ocracy, as a process, is also ever changing. W hat the G reeks called dem ocracy
w ould not be recognizable as dem ocracy to the m odem day A m erican, and vice versa.
The Greeks had a lim ited sense o f suffrage and “elected” people through a lottery.
Today, there is a greater expectation o f choice w ith respect to selecting our
representatives. Because dem ocracy is an am biguous concept, there has been a
continual effort to understand the nature o f dem ocracy. Political scientists seek to
create m odels that w ill explain and predict how people will behave in dem ocratic
societies. This work intends to offer an explanation for one aspect o f the dem ocratic
process. This thesis w ill exam ine how levels o f intensity, with respect to political
participation, are affected by the characteristics a right exhibits. If the rights exhibit
the characteristics o f a public good, the public will exhibit less intensity. If the rights

exhibit the characteristics o f a private good, the public will exhibit more intensity. A
more com plete definition o f public and private goods follows.
It is the intention o f this thesis to accom plish three things. First, to reconcile
Robert D ah l’s concept o f polyarchy with M ad iso n 's concept o f dem ocracy. Second,
to argue that rights can be sub-divided into tw o groups: political rights and econom ic
rights, and, that by classifying rights into tw o groups, it m ight help explain why. in
dem ocracies, people react w ith differing intensities to different types o f policy issues.
This is not to im ply that all rights fall into a category o f either a purely econom ic or
purely political rights. Rather, there is a spectrum w hich spans from purely econom ic
to purely political. M ost rights will fall som ew here in between the tw o extrem es. The
reason for classifying rights into two groups is to suggest that issues that revolve
around the concept o f econom ic liberty attract such a high level o f intensity that a
political m ajority becom es m ore difficult to achieve than with issues that revolve
around political liberties. From the standpoint o f dem ocratic theory, such a
hypothesis w ould help explain why, at times. A m erican dem ocracy functions
sm oothly, while at other tim es, A m erican dem ocracy gridlocks into inaction. The last
chapter will engage Dahl in a “conversation” . In essence, this thesis will try to
extrapolate from D ah l’s body o f work, with regards to dem ocratic theory, how he
w ould respond to this tension between econom ic rights and political rights. Each o f
these three steps will be elaborated upon.
This thesis will attem pt to explain an additional portion o f the dem ocratic
process that Dahl and M adison neglected. To do this, a clear definition o f dem ocracy
is needed. It is not my intention to offer a new definition o f dem ocracy. This thesis

will only try to reconcile M ad iso n 's views o f dem ocracy with D ah l’s views. In order
to lim it the scope o f the inquiry, the study will be lim ited to the A m erican experience
with dem ocracy. The foundation o f A m erican dem ocracy can be best explained or
described by the works of Jam es M adison. As the main philosophical force behind
the drafting o f the C onstitution and the Bill o f R ights, M adison has a unique
understanding o f A m erica’s dem ocratic system . H ow ever, the dem ocratic process has
evolved since M adison. In order to update dem ocratic th eo ry 1, an attem pt will be
m ade to reconcile D ah l’s interpretation o f dem ocracy w ith M ad iso n 's plan for a
dem ocratic republic.
The second part o f the thesis will argue that M adison and D ahl failed to
develop a holistic theory o f dem ocracy because they failed to develop the differences
betw een econom ic rights and political rights. This idea is the additional aspect o f
dem ocratic theory that will be explained. It will be suggested that there exists two
types o f rights; econom ic rights and political rights.

And, in order to fully understand

how A m erican dem ocracy functions, dem ocratic theorists m ust be able to understand
how and why people react differently tow ards the allocation o f each type o f rights.
O ne possible explanation may already exist. Econom ists have already developed
theories w hich explain why people react with different intensities to different types of
econom ic goods. It may be possible to use those ideas to explain why people react
differently to unique types o f “political goods” .

1 M adison was w riting before the industrial revolution and Dahl was writing
after the industrial revolution. Dahl will m ake the argum ent that “corporate
capitalism ” changed the way dem ocracies functioned.

For years, econom ists have tried to explain the nature of the econom ic
m arketplace. They have developed theories w hich explain how incentive structures
dictate the way people behave in the econom ic m arketplace." In addition, political
scientists, such as Joseph Schum peter, have also tried to develop theories which
explain how people behave in the “political m arketplace"/ In this sense, a political
m arketplace refers to the process by which voters com pete for goods and services
provided by the U nited States governm ent and politicians com pete for votes from the
populace. It can be assum ed that ju st as suppliers and buyers in an econom ic
m arketplace react to differing incentive structures, legislators and voters in the
political m arketplace also react to sim ilar incentive structures.
In the tradition o f public choice theory, w hich “em ploys the analytic tools of
econom ics to understand and evaluate political processes"4 this thesis will specifically
describe one type o f econom ic theory and superim pose that theory on the political
m arketplace. E conom ists have used collective action theory to explain why people
react differently to the allocation o f public goods as opposed to the allocation of
private goods.5 W ith that distinction in mind, it is possible to suggest that political

2 G arrett H ardin. “The Tragedy o f the C om m ons” (SC IEN CE 162, No. 1,
1968), 1244-46.
3 Joseph Schum peter. Capitalism, Socialism a n d D em ocracy (New York:
H arper and B rothers, 1942), 291.
4 Edw ard Zelinsky. “Jam es M adison and Public C hoice at Gucci Gulch: A
procedural defense o f tax expenditures” Yale Law Journal 102. no. 5 (M arch 1993).
5 R onald Cose. “The Problem o f Social C ost,” Journal o f Law and Econom ics
3, (Oct 1960), 37.

rights have the same characteristics as public goods and econom ic rights have the
same characteristics as private goods. This concept is also relevant to M adison and
Dahl. Dahl argues that when people seek to provide public goods they are acting in
the interests o f the general com m unity. Thus they are exhibiting traits w hich promote
civic virtue. H ow ever, when people begin to pursue private goods or econom ic
rights, they begin to ignore civic virtue. As a result. D ah l’s pluralism becom es a
double-edged sword. Pluralism can prom ote civic virtue, or it can ignore civic virtue
in favor of personal interest.6
Econom ic collective action theory argues that public goods have the
characteristics o f non-rivalry, non-divisibility and non-excludability.7 In essence, this
m eans that public goods can not be used up, people can not be denied access to them
and they can not be divided up. As an exam ple, a lighthouse is a public good. If
person A looks at the light, he does not consum e the light, leaving less light for
person B. Also, person A cannot be denied the use o f the lighthouse, even if he did
not contribute to its production costs. And last, percentage shares o f the light cannot
be allocated to person A and person B. All people receive 100% o f a public good, or
nothing.
In contrast, private goods have none o f the above characteristics. For instance,
land is a private good. Land is subject to rivalry. For every acre that person A buys,
that is one less acre that person B has available to purchase. Also, land is excludable.

6 Robert Dahl and Edw ard Tuffte. Size and D em ocracy (Stanford: Stanford
U niversity Press, 1973).
7 H arvey Rosen. P ublic Finance (Illinois: Irwin, 1988), 62-63.

If person A buys an acre o f land, person B can be denied access to that land. And last.
land is divisible. Person A and person B can own different am ounts of land, whereas
person A and Person B can not own different am ounts o f light produced bv the
lighthouse. M adison understood the concept o f rivalry. His definition of faction and
his understanding o f how they w ould interact suggest that he understood that many
political decisions w ould not be reached through a cooperative effort. In many ways.
M adison’s definition o f factionalism im plies that all political processes are a zerosum gam e and that the civic virtue Dahl is concerned with does not truly exist. Lester
Thurow , an econom ist, also sees the effects o f zero-sum gam es on the dem ocratic
process. He writes,
[zero-sum gam es] force a dem ocracy into a no-w in situation where,
w hatever it decides about the ju st distribution o f resources, there will
be a large num ber, perhaps a majority, o f unhappy voters. D istributional
issues are highly contentious and precisely the kind o f issues that
dem ocracies find it m ost difficult to solve. It is not we versus them.
but us versus us in a zero-sum gam e.8
It will be the assertion o f this thesis that collective action theory can be
effective in explaining the political m arketplace and thus effective in explaining
specific aspects o f dem ocracy in general. For exam ple, free speech, a political right,
is also not subject to rivalry, divisibility or excludability. H owever, an econom ic
benefit, such as a research grant, is subject to the above three characteristics.
This thesis will exam ine, to w hat extent this distinction betw een political and
econom ic rights or “g o ods’ is im portant to dem ocratic theory and how can it be used
to explain how people actually behave. Dahl, a strong advocate o f the behavioral

revolution with in political science, feels it is im portant to understand what m otivates
citizens to act. It is helpful to understand to what extent Dahl w ould support such a
distinction. He has dedicated a large am ount o f his scholarship to show ing why a
pure m ajoritarian system is not always successful. Dahi w ould probably welcom e
another attem pt to explain the effects o f political participants w ho have a
disproportionate am ount o f political pow er on the dem ocratic process. He would also
be interested in understanding why certain groups have a disproportionate am ount of
power. A lthough he may not agree with every aspect o f the hypothesis presented in
this work, there is evidence that he w ould understand the logic o f the hypothesis.
The third part o f the thesis will postulate that political rights, like public goods
suffer from a “free rider” problem . Conversely, econom ic rights, like private goods,
do not have a “free rider” problem . A free rider is som eone w ho understands that a
good or service will m ost likely be produced with or w ithout his or her contribution.
Based on that know ledge, the individual w ill tend not to contribute to the production
costs, know ing that the good or service will be non-excludable. W e avoid the free
rider problem when allocating public goods by m aking taxes m andatory. H owever, in
the realm o f politics, and the “allocation” o f “political rights." there is no process to
enforce participation. Therefore, if an individual feels that a political “right” being
pursued by a specific faction in the U nited States will exhibit the characteristics o f a
public good, that individual will have a greater tendency to be a free rider. Although
no attem pt will be made to em pirically m easure the free rider problem , it will be

8 Lester Thurow . The Zero-Sum Society (New York: Penguin Books, 1980),
18.
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argued that this phenom enon directly affects the level o f intensity with which people
participate in our political system. It will be suggested that the allocation or
enforcem ent o f political rights, such as free speech or public safety, w hich have a free
rider problem , will attract less intense participation by the public than the allocation
o f econom ic rights, such as budgetary' allocations, will attract a higher level of
intensity with respect to political participation. In turn, one could then argue that with
respect to the allocation o f econom ic rights, there is a greater likelihood o f tyranny of
the minority.
O ther political theorists, as it pertains to participation levels, have touched on
the distinction betw een econom ic rights and political rights. In 1975, Crozier,
H untington and B rittan postulated that “excess participation” could lead to an
“overload” o f the dem ocratic process.9 They noted that such a phenom enon would
m ost likely occur when the political system tried to deal w ith “popular econom ic
dem ands.” Piven and C low ard identify an entire school o f thought w hich revolves
around the concept o f “non-participation” .10 The general argum ent this school puts
forth is that over participation can ham per leaders ability to be flexible and lead to a
“crisis o f dem ocracy” .11
W ith respect to the am biguous nature o f the term ‘intensity’, this thesis will
not attem pt to suggest a “norm al” level o f participation. N or will it suggest a “good”

9 As cited in, R ichard C low ard and Frances Piven. Why A m erica n 's D o n 't
Vote (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 23.
10 Ibid., 24.
11 Ibid., 24.

or “bad" level o f participation. Dahl, in his A Preface to D em ocratic Theory.
understood the difficulty in em pirically m easuring intensity. H owever, he did argue
that, as a concept, intensity is a useful tool to help in the understanding o f dem ocratic
political systems. The goal of this thesis will be to offer the idea that intensities are
affected by the type o f right being allocated and attem pt to exam ine how Dahl m ight
react to such a suggestion.
In the final section o f the thesis Dahl will be draw n “back into the
conversation.” By looking for evidence w ithin D ah l’s w ritings, an attem pt will be
m ade to explain how Dahl would react, support or criticize the hypothesis. This type
o f m ethodology is one Dahl uses, quite frequently, him self. In A Preface to Econom ic
D em ocracy, D ahl proposes a theory with respect to the dem ocratization o f the
econom ic firm. He seeks to determ ine if de T ocqueville w ould find his theory
acceptable. He writes,
A lthough de Tocqueville was in my view a great political theorist, he was
not the kind o f theorist w ho deals explicitly w ith the so n s o f questions
raised in the paragraph above. H is theory is often im plicit, deeply
em bedded in its context, and highly qualified. The attem pt to make his
theory m ore explicit, less contextual and less qualified, as I do here,
is to attribute to him a theory that he him self m ight have found
acceptable. 12

W hat Dahl does w ith de Tocqueville, this work will do w ith Dahl. Specifically, there
will be an investigation as to how Dahl w ould respond to the notion that intense
m inorities pursuing econom ic rights have an inordinate am ount o f influence in the
political process. It will also be necessary to engage Dahl in a “dialogue” w ith respect

to norm ative questions. For instance, when discussing intense m inorities with
inordinate am ounts o f pow er, the question arises, are intense m inorities detrim ental to
dem ocracy? W hat is an inordinate am ount o f pow er? Is it detrim ental to dem ocracy
if an apathetic m ajority dom inates an intense m inority? These questions require a
value judgm ent in order to answ er them.
The conclusion o f the thesis will make the argum ent that understanding how
intensity o f participation affects the political process is im portant to understanding
how dem ocracies actually function. Furtherm ore, if it can be assum ed that
understanding the nature o f intense participation is im portant, then it can also be
argued that understanding the factors w hich effect intensity levels is also im portant.
In conclusion, the thesis will seek to offer one possible explanation as to why
different groups and individuals react w ith different intensities at different times in
the dem ocratic process, depending on w hether the process is allocating econom ic
resources or enforcing political rights.

i^
' Robert Dahl. A Preface to Econom ic D em ocracy (Berkeley: U niversity o f
C alifornia Press, 1985), 8.

C H A PTER 2
“M ad iso n 's D ilem m a”
Jam es M adison is considered the “Father of the United States C onstitution.” '
Robert Dahl is considered by m any political scientists to be the preem inent
dem ocratic theorist o f m odem tim es.2 M adison is credited with creating a significant
portion o f the A m erican dem ocratic system 3 and D ahl is credited with critiquing large
portions o f the system that M adison helped create. Therefore, it is im portant to first
reconcile D ah l’s view o f dem ocracy w ith M adison’s. First, a brief synopsis of
M adison’s view o f dem ocracy will be provided. Next, D ahl’s criticism s o f M adison
will be exam ined, follow ed by an attem pt to highlight areas o f agreem ent betw een the
tw o theorists. Lastly, the contributions o f their respective dem ocratic theories will be
assessed.
W hen looking at the philosophies o f M adison it is im portant to exam ine a
wide array o f docum ents. Som e theorists have m ade the mistake o f focusing too
narrow ly on Federalist # 10 as the sole source for understanding M adisonian
thought.4 It is necessary to look at, not only all the Federalist Papers w ritten by
M adison, but also to look at his notes on the Federal Convention, his letters to various
political leaders and friends and other public docum ents w hich he authored, such as
the V irginia R esolution.

1 Irving Brant, Jam es M adison: The Virginia R evolutionist (New York:
B obbs-M errill Co., 1941), xi.
2 Luciano Pye. “R eview o f D em ocracy and Its C ritics” (A m erican Political
Science Review 84, no. 9), 627.
•3

LanceB anning, The Sacred Fire o f Liberty (Ithica: C ornell U niversity Press,
19959,8.
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The reason for reconciling the views o f Dahl and M adison, as opposed to two
other dem ocratic theorists, is based upon several factors. First, both M adison and
Dahl were concerned w ith the pow er o f com peting groups in political society.
Second, both theorists w ere concerned with the abilities o f those groups to tyrannize
the rest o f society. M ost im portantly, both theorists developed solutions with respect
to controlling the pow er of group. H ow ever, their solutions w ere not the same. By
reconciling the views o f the tw o theorists, one can develop a strong sense o f how
groups, both m inority and m ajority groups, influence politics. And, one can begin to
exam ine m ethods and dem ocratic processes to control the pow er o f groups.
At the outset, it is im portant to note that M adison, like Dahl, was not
com pletely consistent over his entire life. It w ould be incorrect to assum e that Jam es
M adison’s w ritings, w hile a m em ber o f Congress operating under the A rticles of
Confederation, will reflect his exact sentim ent w hile he w as Secretary o f State or
later, President o f the U nited States. In fact, it has been argued that there is an
obvious discontinuity betw een the M adison o f the 1780s and the M adison of the
1790s.5 It is im portant to rem em ber that in addition to being a political theorist,
M adison was also an active politician most o f his adult life. The sam e M adison that
argued for m ore centralized pow er as a m em ber o f the C ontinental Congress and
Constitutional C onvention, also penned the V irginia R esolution w hich laid the

4 Ibid., 4.
5 Joshua Cohen. “R eview Sym posium ” Journal o f Politics 53, No. 1 (Feb
1991), 215.

theoretical foundation for concepts such as state nullification and succession.6
M adison supported Thom as Jefferson’s purchase of L ouisiana because it would
increase the diversity o f interests in the United States and thus increase the num ber of
factions which was im portant in M adison’s schem e to “control the m istiefs of
faction.” 7 H owever, he opposed A lexander H am ilton’s proposal for a national bank
because such a m ove w ould create an overly broad interpretation of the N ecessary
and Proper Clause. These contradictory argum ents, w ith respect to the limits o f
federal pow er, indicate the com plexities of M adisonian thought.
In response to such criticism s, it could be argued that M adison was one the
m ost consistent Founders. Jam es Read suggests that M adison’s consistency can be
found in his unw avering defense o f civil liberties.8 He contends that historians
m isunderstand M adison because they focus upon his inconsistent support o f federal
and state pow ers.9 H owever, Read argues that M adison forem ost concern was for
civil liberties and therefore attacked state and federal pow er equally in their defense.
This is not to say that M adison was a libertarian. H e believed there was a legitim ate

6 Jam es Sm ith, The Republic o f Letters (London: W W N orton & Co., 1995),
1072.
7 Jam es M adison. F ederalist Papers # 10 (Toronto: B antam B ooks, 1982),
45.
8 Jam es Read. “ O ur C om plicated System ” Political Theory 23, No. 3 (August
1995), 456.
9 Lance Banning, a noted biographer o f M adison suggests that M adison was
influenced by his participation at the convention in P hiladelphia as much as he
influenced the m eeting. He argues, “Studies o f the C onstitutional C onvention rightly
stress the pow erful effects o f M adison’s original proposals. It m ay be equally
im portant to ask how M adison was influenced by the fram ing o f the C onstitution.” In
fact, m any scholars refer to the “evolution of his founding vision.”

14
role for governm ent. He was consistent in that he w anted checks on the state
governm ents if the small geographical size o f the states did not create enough factions
to prevent tyranny o f the m ajority. A t the sam e time, he w anted checks o f the federal
governm ent to prevent invasions into realm s he thought should be beyond the
political process.
Like M adison’s thoughts, there is also an evolutionary nature to D ahl’s
scholarship. In the 1950s, D ahl was sim ply offering new interpretations w ith respect
to the w ay pluralist dem ocracies functioned.10 Tow ards the end o f his career, he was
advocating a dem ocratization o f econom ic firm s.11 Jack N agel, from the U niversity
o f Pennsylvania, writes, “there is some truth to Jefferey Issac’s contention that the
pluralist Dahl o f 1948 through 1965 is an aberration from the dem ocratic-socialist
ideas evident in his later w orks.” 12 Nagel adds that it is often difficult to determ ine if
Dahl is a defender o f dem ocracy, or a critic. D ah l’s scholarship m oves from an
am oral approach to politics to study o f politics w hich is concerned w ith norm ative
questions about equality or equity and political influence. In the early part o f D ahl’s
career, he advocates the position that the public good will be arrived at via some
invisible hand m echanism if all pluralist groups pursue their ow n self-interests. Later,
Dahl argues that a pure “Sm ithian" approach to politics may describe the reality of
A m erican politics, but that it does not create the ends that dem ocratic countries

10 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Econom ic D em ocracy (Los Angeles: The
U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 1985), 112.
11 Jack Nagle, “R eview Sym posium ,” 215.
12 Jack Nagle, “R eview Sym posium ,” 226.
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should achieve. T hus he concludes that there m ust be som e lim its on the pursuit of
self-interest in a pluralist society.
In essence, com paring Jam es M adison to R obert D ahl is not akin to
com paring tw o stationary portraits. Their lives and their tim es dictated growth,
revision and change o f their philosophical outlooks.

These evolutionary changes

m ust be considered w hen attem pting to reconcile the view s o f the tw o men.
H ow ever, m ost o f the em phasis o f this thesis will be on the context o f their written
works..

MADISONIAN DEMOCRACY
In his view o f dem ocracy, M adison placed a large em phasis on protecting the
rights o f m inorities and concerned him self w ith m ethods o f controlling the adverse
effects of factions. In addition, he attem pted to reconcile an extended republic with
classic republicanism , and in general, argued that a curtailm ent o f the dem ocratic
process was necessary to insure the survival o f a dem ocratic state.13 These four
aspects have been highlighted because they are also subjects with w hich Dahl
concerned him self w ithin the course o f his writings.
It can be easily argued that w hat sets M adison apart from m any other theorists
o f his day was his concern for protecting the rights o f m inority groups and
individuals. M adison feared both the possibility o f “tyranny o f the m ajority” and to
lesser degree, “tyranny o f the m inority.” M adison was less fearful o f “tyranny o f the
m inority” because he felt m inorities could easily be outvoted. In one o f M adison’s
m ore notable speeches to the delegates o f the C onstitutional C onvention, he argues,

16
The lesson we are to draw from the w hole is, that w here a majority
are united by a com m on sentim ent, and have an opportunity, the
rights o f the m inor party becom e insecure. In a republican governm ent
the m ajority, if united, have always an oppo rtu n ity .14
M adison felt that m ajority tyranny w ould m ost often occur at the state level. One
proposal he m ade at the Federal C onvention to prevent such abuses was the “federal
veto.” 15 A gain, M adison felt that because states w ere so sm all, they w ould not
encom pass enough factions to prevent m ajority tyranny. A lthough this proposal
becam e one o f the few o f M ad iso n ’s suggestions that was not adopted, it provides
insight into his concern about m ajority abuses. The federal veto w ould have allowed
the national governm ent to nullify any state law. M adison’s logic was that such a law
w ould prevent states from abusing less pow erful m inority groups at the state level.
D espite losing the vote for a federal veto, his b elief in the need for a federal veto did
com e to partial fruition in the form o f the federal Suprem acy C lause in A rticle VI of
the Constitution. This clause coupled with the eventual developm ent o f judicial
review allow ed the federal governm ent to overpow er state laws.
A nother w ay to protect m inority interests was to rem ove som e liberty issues
from the voting p ro cess.16 In other w ords, ensure certain rights regardless o f w hat the
"m ajority will" or “m inority w ill” m ight be. This concept is generally
institutionalized w ithin the functioning o f the Suprem e Court. M eaning, the Suprem e

13 Banning, The S acred Fire o f Liberty, 205.
14 Jam es M adison, Journal o f the Constitutional C onvention (Chicago: Scott,
Foresm an & Co., 1989), 135.
15 Ibid., 398.

C ourt eventually assum ed the pow er to veto laws w hich are contrary to specific rights
protected by the Bill o f R ights. Som e historians have argued that the Founding
Fathers did not envision the practice o f judicial rev iew .17 H owever, Jam es W ilson
m oved for such a pow er to be invested with the Suprem e C ourt on July 21Mat
Io

Philadelphia. M adison seconded the m otion and spoke in favor o f such a move.

In

addition, it w as M adison w ho drafted the Bill of R ights, the ultim ate repository of
m inority and individual rights. In all fairness to M adison’s critics, it should be noted
that M adison initially objected to the drafting o f the Bill o f Rights. Eventually tw o
influences m oved him to change his mind. The first was political expediency. The
second was the b elief that a Bill o f Rights w ould galvanize public opinion in support
o f civil liberties and thus act as a check on potential abuses by the governm ent. Such
a belief is notable because D ahl, like many o f the A nti-Federalists o f M adison’s day,
suggests that M adison failed to com prehend the im portance o f a hom ogeneous
political culture in preventing tyranny o f the m ajority. H owever, M adison’s speech in
support o f the Bill o f R ights in C ongress w eakens such an argum ent. M adison
argued,
It m ay be thought all paper barriers against the pow er o f the com m unity
are too w eak to be w orthy o f atten tio n ...y et, as they have a tendency
to im press som e degree o f respect for them, to establish public opinion
in their favor, and rouse the attention o f the w hole, it may be one means
to control the m ajo rity .19

16 Jam es Yoho, “W hat W as Left Unsaid in Federalist # 10” Polity 27 (Sum m er
95): 587.
17 B anning, The Sacred Fire o f Liberty, 398.
18 Jam es M adison, Journal o f the Constitutional C onvention, 118.
19 M adison quoted by Jam es Read, “O ur C om plicated System ,” 459.
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Finally, no exam ination o f M adison’s concern for m inority and individual
rights can be com plete w ithout incorporating F ederalist # 10. In the essay, M adison
argues that m any past confederations had failed because they contained too few
protections for m inority groups. He w rites “that the public good is disregarded in the
conflicts o f rival parties; and that m easures are too often decided, not according to
rules o f justice, and the rights o f the m inor party; but by the superior force o f an
interested m ajority.” 20
Joyce A ppleby argues the reason M adison was so concerned with m inority
rights was his fear that in an overw helm ing agricultural society, an egalitarian
political m ovem ent could strip w ealthy people o f their property.21 She contends that
M adison saw the open W estern frontier as a natural equalizer o f wealth. H ow ever, he
was also aw are that large landed property ow ners w ould becom e a sm aller and
sm aller m inority. This opened the possibility for the m ajority to seize w ealth from
the aristocratic m inority, o f which M adison happened to be a member. M uch o f
M adison’s correspondence w ith Thom as Jefferson suggests that M adison supported
Jeffersonian notions o f an agricultural society.22 M ad iso n 's writing in F ederalist # 10
indicates that he feared possible class conflicts in the future. However, the idea o f an
agricultural society acting to equalize w ealth w as prim arily Jefferson’s idea. It is
more likely that M adison supported Jefferson’s notions o f an extended frontier in

20 Jam es M adison, The F ederalist Papers{Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 43.
j

Joyce A ppleby, C apitalism a n d the N ew Social O rder ( New York: New
York U niversity Press, 1984), 31 - 3 5 .
"" Peter Sm ith, A R epublic o f Letters, 938-949.
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order to increase the diversity o f interests, professions, classes, which is so essential
to his theories concerning the effects o f factions.
W hether or not M adison was able to adequately balance the rights and powers
o f the m inority and m ajority is subject to debate. O ver 200 years o f Am erican history
with only a lim ited num ber o f blatant abuses o f the m inority by the m ajority seem s to
suggest M adison succeeded on som e level. The U nited States governm ent has
survived a num ber o f secessionist threats, including the H artford Convention o f 1814
and the nullification crisis in South C arolina in 1832. The C ivil W ar is the notable
exception: a fact D ahl will point to as evidence that M ad iso n ’s system o f governm ent
does not m ediate conflicts betw een m ajority and m inority factions, but that a
politically hom ogeneous society serves that function."
The theories o f Jam es M adison with respect to m ajority and m inority tyranny
are also closely tied to the concept o f factionalism. The m ost com pact explanation of
factionalism appears in F ederalist # 10. In F ederalist # 10, M adison argues factions
are dangerous because they put self-interest before the public interest, but despite the
danger they pose, factions should be encouraged to flourish. His rationale is that if
there are a m ultitude o f factions, the effort needed to unite a num ber o f factions in
order to create a m ajority is so cum bersom e, that such an act will be very unlikely.
M adison begins by defining a faction24 as,

" Dahl, A Preface to D em ocractic Theory, 82.
24 Dahl is critical o f this definition because it fails to com pletely define what
exactly is “adverse to the rights o f others.” Dahl reasons that, if too narrowly defined,
any act by the m ajority could be considered tyrannous. Yet, if too broadly defined,
no act by the m ajority could be considered tyrannous.
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A num ber o f citizens, w hether am ounting to a m ajority or m inority o f the
whole, who are united and actuated by som e com m on im pulse o f passion
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perm anent
aggregate interests o f the co m m u n ity .'5
H aving defined faction, M adison then argues that factions can not be
elim inated w ith-out elim inating liberty itself. He writes,
“Liberty is to faction, w hat air is to fire. But it could not be a less folly
to abolish liberty, w hich is essential to political life, because it nourishes
faction, than it w ould be to w ish the annihilation o f air, w hich is essential
to anim al life, because it im parts to fire its destructive agency.36

Therefore, it was im portant to M adison to create a system that allow ed factions to
exist, yet at the sam e tim e control their destructive nature. He suggests tw o remedies.
First, use factions to com bat the influence o f other factions. In Federalist # 51, he
w rites, “A m bition m ust be m ade to counteract am bition.” In #10 he adds, “the
sm aller the society, the few er probably will be the distinct parties and in terests...th e
m ore easily will they [the m ajority] be able to execute their plans o f oppression.”27
W hat truly m akes M adison’s ideas, at the tim e, revolutionary is his suggestion
that the way to increase the num ber o f factions, and thus lim it the pow er o f any one
faction is to create a large republic. Beginning w ith A ristotle and continuing through
m ost 18th century thinkers, the prevalent attitude w as that dem ocracies could only
exist on a sm all scale.28 The A nti-Federalist frequently cited M ontesquieu’s Spirit o f
the Law s to support their claim that dem ocratic nations m ust be small nations.
M adison rejects this idea. A gain in # 10 he writes,

25 M adison, The F ederalist Papers, 43.
26 Ibid., 43.
27 M adison, The Federalist P apers, 46.
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Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety o f parties and interests:
you m ake it less probable that a m ajority o f the w hole will have a com m on
m otive to invade the rights o f other citizens.29
M adison made the sam e argum ents at the Federal C onvention.
The only rem edy is. to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the com m unity
into so great a num ber o f interests and parties, that, in the first place, a
m ajority will not be likely, at the same m om ent, to have a com m on interest
separate from that o f the w hole or the m inority.30
M adison sum s up his view by suggesting that a large republic can prevent abuses of
both m ajority and m inority factions. He claim s that m inority factions can always be
defeated by a sim ple m ajority vote.31 W hereas m ajority factions will not be likely to
form at all, and if they do, they will be tem porary m ajorities m ost likely uniting for
the “public good.”’" “In the extended republic,” M adison exclaim s in F ederalist #
50, “and am ong the great variety o f interests, parties and sects, a coalition o f a
m ajority o f the w hole could seldom take place on any other principles than those of
justice and the general good.”
At this point it is only im portant to em phasize three aspects o f M adisonian
thought. First, M adison rejected the age old concept that the purpose o f governm ent
is to prom ote civic virtue.33 He accepted the idea that people are inherently selfinterested and w ill act on that self-interest even if it m eans enacting policies harmful

28 _______, Theories o f D em ocracy, 123
29 M adison, The F ederalist Papers, 46.
30 M adison, The Journal o f the Constitutional Convention, 118.
31 M adison, The F ederalist Papers, 46.
32 Ibid., 47.

to other groups in society. Second. M adison rejected the idea that dem ocratic
governm ents can only exist and survive on a small scale. He actively prom oted the
idea that the republic should be a large and diverse society. Third. M adison set
him self up for an apparent contradiction. M adison argued that a diversity o f interests
will prom ote dem ocracy and prevent abuses by the governm ent.34 H ow ever, he also
understands that a politically hom ogeneous society is necessary to prevent massive
cleavages in society that can result in political gridlock.35 All three o f these issues
w ill be exam ined in m ore depth in follow ing chapters.
In the first chapter o f A Preface to D em ocratic Theory. D ahl, like many before
him , accuses M adison o f being one o f the “great undem ocratic thinkers o f all tim e.”
A lthough it can be argued that this is an exaggeration, M adison did perceive a limit as
to how “dem ocratic” a governm ent should be. In F ederalist # 55, M adison rem arks,
“In all very num erous assem blies, o f w hatever characters com posed, passion never
fails to wrest the scepter o f reason. H ad every A thenian citizen been a Socrates, every
A thenian assem bly w ould still have been a m ob.” In F ederalist # 14, he refers to the
“turbulent dem ocracies o f ancient G reece and m odem Italy.” In F ederalist # 10, he is
m ore forceful.
D em ocracies have ever been spectacles o f turbulence and contention
have ever been found incom patible with personal security, or the rights
o f property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they
have been violent in their deaths.36

33 Peter Smith, A R epublic o f Letters, 566.
34 Jam es M adison, Journal o f the Constitutional C onvention, 117.
35 M ichael K am m en, Foundations o f the U. S. Constitution, 136.
36 M adison, The F ederalist Papers, 46.
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H ow ever, it should be noted that m ost o f M ad iso n 's criticism s o f dem ocracy were
directed at direct form s of dem ocracy.

His argum ents in favor o f the V irginia Plan

over the N ew Jersey Plan at the C onstitutional C onventions highlight M adison's deep
seated support for dem ocracy on a representative level. In addition. M adison viewed
dem ocracy as m ore than ju st m ajority rule.” It was as im portant to M adison to
protect m inority interests as it was to allow the m ajority to rule.
M adison was not alone in his feeling tow ards direct dem ocracy. M any o f the
Founders objected to it as a form of governm ent. G eorge M ason declared at the
Constitutional C onvention that the failure o f the A rticles o f C onfederation was due to
excesses in dem ocracy.38 M adison supported this argum ent. On June 6th o f the
C onvention he argued, “In G reece and Rom e the rich and poor, the creditors and
debtors, as w ell as the patricians and plebeians, alternately oppressed each other with
equal unm ercifulness.”39
M adison was not im m une to criticism , w ith respect to being undem ocratic, in
his own time. Edm und R andolph and Elbridge Gerry refused to ratify the
C onstitution on grounds that it was not dem ocratic enough.40 M any o f the AntiFederalist argum ents centered around their objections to the undem ocratic aspects o f
the C onstitution. H owever, in the next chapter, it can be show n that M adison was not

37 Such an idea distinguishes M adison from other theorists such as de
Tocquiville w ho argued that dem ocracy was the “absolute sovereignty o f the
m ajority.”
ID

M adison, Journal o f the C onstitutional C onvention, 117.
39 Ibid., 118.
40 M icheal K am m en, The Foundations o f the U.S. C onstitution, 163.
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an anti-dem ocrat, but sim ply aware o f the “excesses o f dem ocracy” and their ill
effects.
Last, it is im possible to discuss the political theories o f Jam es M adison
w ithout looking at the K entucky and V irginia R esolutions. Earlier, it was m entioned
that the intensity w ith w hich a group pursues an interest m ight affect the w ay a
dem ocracy functions. It is possible that M adison understood this concept early on in
the developm ent o f the A m erican Republic. M adison was deeply troubled by the
passage o f the federal governm ent’s Crisis Law s, which included the A lien and
Sedition Acts, during the presidency o f John A dam s.41 M adison saw them as an
obvious violation o f m inority and individual rights. And yet, each law had been
passed in the representative dem ocratic process that he had helped create. M adison’s
concern led to a collaboration with the V ice-President Thom as Jefferson. Together,
they penned the V irginia and K entucky Resolutions.
Only ten years after the C onstitution was ratified, M adison was confronted
w ith a situation in w hich a very passionate m inority was intensely opposed to a law
passed by a slim m ajority. The law, in M adison’s opinion, was a blatant violation o f
the new ly enacted B ill o f R ights.42 As a result, M adison was faced with a dilem m a.
He was forced to consider w hether an intense m inority has the right to nullify laws
passed by a m ajority. In analyzing this historical incident, it is necessary to specify
w hat is m eant by m ajority and m inority. O bviously, there was a m ajority in the
Congress that supported the C risis Law s. H ow ever, the election o f 1800 suggests

41 B ordon, Parties and P olitics in the Early Republic, 1789-1815, 53.
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there was a m ajority o f citizens in the nation that opposed the law. However, if one
exam ines this event from a strictly institutional approach, M adison’s dilem m a still
exists. In the fram ew ork o f a representative governm ent, a slim m ajority enacted a
law, w hich was clearly unconstitutional according to M adison, over the objections o f
an intense m inority o f representatives.
Jefferson, in his original draft o f the K entucky R esolution, forcefully argues
that states do have the right to nullify national law s.43 H ow ever, M adison is more
aware o f the consequences o f such a doctrine. He successfully encouraged Jefferson
to use m ore m oderate language. M adison him self, how ever, still had to grapple with
the issue when he authored his own V irginia R esolution. M adison chose to argue that
by expanding the grand ju ry pool to include people o f all states, there w ould be more
protection for civil rights.44 He also called for other states to “denounce” the passage
o f the A lien and Sedition A cts. H ow ever, he stops short o f calling for states to
assum e the pow er o f nullification.
The irony for M adison was that he had devised the C onstitutional system, in
part, to prevent state governm ents from becom ing oppressive tow ards a m inority
faction. He had argued for a federal veto to prevent such abuses. In 1798 how ever,
M adison is faced w ith a reversal of his ow n argum ent. Should the state governm ents
or any “significant interest”45 have a veto over federal legislation? A lthough M adison

42 Ibid., 56.
43 Sm ith, A R epublic o f Letters, 1072.
" ~ 44 Ibid., 1073.
45 John C alhoun’s term .

26
tried to lim it the scope o f his response to sim ply condem ning the acts as opposed to
calling for state nullification pow ers, he succeeded in opening the door for John
Calhoun and others to argue for doctrines such as ''concurrent m ajorities”46 In some
w ays, M adison provided am m unition for later politicians to destroy the very Union he
created.
It is also possible that, from M adison’s perspective, the crisis caused by the
A lien and Sedition Acts was not a failure o f the C onstitutional system he helped
devise, but a failure o f the representatives at the tim e to properly perform their duties.
M adison’s dual beliefs in the “public good” and that representatives should “refined
the views o f the public” suggests that he w ould have expected the C ongressional
representatives to prevent the C risis Law s from ev er being enacted. M adison
believed that representatives should be responsive to their constituencies, but not
com pletely beholden to them. He also felt that representatives should act as a
“broker” to balance the desires o f their constituency w hile, at the same time,
prom oting the public good for all citizens. Therefore, if the Federalists had acted as
“proper” representatives and “refined the view s” being created by the hysteria
surrounding the French Revolution, the C onstitutional crisis caused by the Alien and
Sedition Acts could have been avoided altogether.
Professor Ronald Peters m akes exactly this point. In his article, “Political
Theory, Political Science and the Preface: A Review o f R obert D ahl,” he argues that
m ost Federalists felt policy m akers should be guided by popular preferences, but only

46 D avid Huston, A Critical Study o f N ullification in South Carolina
(Gloucester: The H enry W arrren Fund, 1896), 125.

after considering other issues such as justice, efficiency and other cultural values.47
Federalist # 71 highlights the Federalist belief in th e “public good.” It states, “The
republican principle dem ands that the deliberate sense o f the com m unity should
govern the conduct of those to w hom they intrust (sic) the m anagem ent o f their
affairs.” The essay continues, “it is the duty o f the persons w hom they have
appointed to be the guardians of those interests to w ithstand the tem porary
delusion.”48
An exam ination o f the crisis of 1798 illustrates the com plexity o f M adison’s
political views.. He show ed his intense interest in protecting the rights o f the m inority
during the Philadelphia Convention. H ow ever, he also show s his am bivalence
tow ards interfering w ith m ajority rule in the context o f his V irginia Resolution. Dahl
will be forced to grapple w ith sim ilar issues in his w ritings 200 years later. W hile
M adison focused on the lim its o f States rights, Dahl focused on the rights o f intense
m inorities, regardless o f geographic location.

47 R obert Perters, “Political Theory, Political Science and the Preface. The
Political Science R eview er 21. No 1. (M ay 1977), 161.

CHAPTER 3
“R econciling Dahl w ith M adison"

DAHL’S CRITICISM OF MADISON

R obert Dahl is highly critical o f M adison on several fronts. His criticism
stem s from tw o significant differences o f opinion. First, D ahl has considerable more
faith in the m ajority rule. A lthough he is uncom fortable w ith the term ‘dem ocracy’
and eventually substitutes the term with “polyarchy,” D ahl adam antly believes that
the system M adison set up is not dem ocratic enough. Second, Dahl believes that
inequality o f w ealth prevents dem ocracies from functioning fairly. M ost o f his m ajor
w orks include a call fo r a redistribution o f wealth or a dem ocratization o f the
econom ic firm. A lthough the above tw o issues dom inate D ah l’s criticism o f
M adison, they are by no m eans an exhaustive list. Dahl also feels that factionalism (a
term used to describe M adisonian thought) does not prevent the possibility of
“tyranny o f the m inority,” distorts the public agenda m aking process, stabilizes
econom ic inequality, and encourages people to ignore the “public good” .
In D ah l’s m ost notable work, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, argues that
M adison did not pay sufficient attention to the possibility o f tyranny o f the m inority.1
Because M adison gave certain political m inorities checks on the political process,
D ahl will insist that M adison is an antidem ocratic theorist. In Federalist # 10,
M adison suggests that tyranny o f the m inority will never occur because o f the
“republican principle” , i.e., the m ajority can always outvote the m inority. H ow ever

1 Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 9.
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“If it can be show n” D ahl counters, “that the operation o f the ‘republican p rin cip le’
w ill not in all cases prevent severe deprivations from being inflicted on the
m ajority by the m inority, then the M adisonian system will not produce a nontyrannous republic.”2 Dahl points to the fact that any tim e a m inority of voters can
prevent the m ajority from enacting its preference, that becom es evidence o f tyranny
o f the m inority. H ence, if a tw o-thirds m ajority is required for some political action,
then a one-third m inority can tyrannize over the m ajority. A gain, Dahl argues,
If determ ination by unanim ity and by m ajority vote are both ruled
out, it follow s that the only rem aining alternative is determ ination
by the decision o f som e m in o rity ...th en we should expect any
m inority w ith this pow er at best to em ploy it in its ow n favor and at
w orst to tyrannize over other m inorities and any m ajority.3
Dahl is sim ply stating that any institutional requirem ent o f a tw o-thirds vote is
actually granting decision m aking pow er to a one-third m inority. Such an argum ent
is an exaggeration. Dahl fails to understand that there is a difference betw een a
m inority vetoing a m ajority decision and a m inority im plem enting its own agenda.
The fact that a m inority o f representatives m ay have a veto over legislative decisions
does not im ply that they can enact their ow n policies. O bviously, if a one-third
m inority can block legislation, a tw o-thirds m ajority can do the same thing.
Dahl is m ore accurate when he claim s that m inorities have the ability to
m aintain the status quo. In some cases, w here a tw o-thirds m ajority is required, a
m inority can prevent new legislation and thus cem ent the status quo.
Dahl also im plies that all factions are not created equal. His argum ent states
that since the developm ent o f “corporate capitalism ” som e groups in a factional

2 Ibid., 16.
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society (Dahl prefers the term pluralist society,) have m ore pow er and influence than
others. In essence, he states that a group can have a disproportionate am ount of
power, with respect to the actual num ber o f people in the group, in a pluralist
society.4 He states,
O rganizational pluralism is perfectly consistent with extensive inequalities.
A lthough critics often attribute to pluralist theory the assertion that groups
are equal in their influence over decisions, it is doubtful anyone who m ight
be described as a theorist o f pluralism has ever made such an assertion.5
Such an argum ent is not m eant to im ply that M adison believed all factions were
created equal. D ahl is sim ply arguing that M adison failed to foresee the industrial
revolution and, therefore, did not realize that the pow er gap betw een factions could be
considerable. So large in fact, that they could distort the pluralist/factionalist system.
Dahl charges that as econom ic wealth has becom e unequally distributed, so
has political pow er. He claim s that in Am erican society a m ajority o f people may
desire better housing, child labor laws, a removal o f slum s and better social security.
H owever, if a m inority, consisting o f em ployers, can prevent such action because o f
inordinate am ounts o f political pow er, then A m erican is suffering from tyranny o f the
m inority. One solution Dahl offers is to insure “political resources o f all organizations
are effectively regulated so that resources are proportional to the num ber of
m em bers.”6
Dahl takes his argum ents one step farther. He claim s that not only is
pluralism not a fair com petition because o f inequalities in w ealth and therefore

3 D ahl, D ilem m as in a Pluralist D em ocracy, 40.
4 Ibid., 40.
5 Ibid., 84.

pow er, he also suggests that factionalism stabilizes inequality, by prom oting the
status quo, thus preventing any chance that organizational equality will occur.7 By
organizational equity, D ahl typically means m oney to m obilize an interest group.
Based on his concern w ith m inority tyranny, Dahl develops his case that
M adison was an anti-dem ocrat. D ahl understands w hy M adison created the
Am erican C onstitution in the m anner he did. He argues that M adison hoped to ensure
that the legislature “acted carefully and wisely, not hastily o r foolishly.”8 M adison
delegated to som e m inorities the authority to halt, delay, or m odify what might
otherw ise be enacted by a sim ple, untram m eled m ajority rule. The rationale for such
structures was to ensure the protection o f certain fundam ental rights. Dahl asserts
that m ost second cham bers, like M ad iso n ’s Senate, are devised to “rectify errors in
m easures passed by the other house and also to serve as a bastion o f m inority rights.”9
A lthough protecting fundam ental rights is a noble goal, Dahl w arns that m inority
pow er can be used to prom ote other agendas besides protecting civil rights. For
instance, Dahl fears that som e m inorities will enact policies to ensure econom ic
dom ination.
Dahl highlights tw o serious risks associated w ith a “m inority veto”. First, “it
is all but im possible to ensure that these special arrangem ents are em ployed by a
m inority solely to protect their fundam ental rights.” 10 And by fundam ental rights,

6 Robert Dahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 83.
7 Ibid., 170.
8 Ibid., 171.
9 Robert D ahl, P reface to D em ocratic Theory, 41.
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D ahl does not mean property. He m eans civil rights. Second, the very rules used to
prom ote m inority protection also prevent the m ajority from changing the rules to
ensure a m ore dem ocratic function. D ahl points to the exam ple o f the Senate Cloture
rule. He notes that changing the filibuster rule was so difficult because the m inority
could prevent changing the rules. This exam ple is what D ahl m eans when he states
that factionalism stabilizes inequalities. O nce the inequality exists, it becom es very
difficult to rem ove the inequality because m inorities will have a veto over such
action.
Dahl pursues the idea o f ‘m inority v eto ’ in another direction. He argues that
dem ocratic societies w ith provisions for m inority protection prom ote the status quo.
Thus, by prescribing deadlock in cases o f equal division o f preferences
[or less than a super m ajority] one is in fact biasing the policy-m aking
process in favor o f all individuals w ho prefer policies requiring
governm ent inaction and against all individuals who prefer policies
requiring governm ent actio n .11
D ahl notes that as a result o f m inority vetoes, civil rights issues w ere constantly held
up in the Senate during the 1960s. He concludes that “the one problem w ith special
procedures is that they rarely can be counted on to work as they should in order to be
acceptable to dem ocratic criteria.” 12 The dem ocratic criteria Dahl refers to is the
ability o f the “dem os” to m aintain final control o f the agenda. In this specific case,
the m ajority could not even bring civil rights legislation to a vote because o f the
pow er o f the filibuster.

10 R obert Dahl, D em ocracy a n d Its Critics, 186.
11 Ibid., 65.
12 Ibid., 67.
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D ahl also labels the M adisonian system anti-dem ocrat because it creates a
“quasi-guardianship’’. Dahl rejects guardianship as proposed by Plato in The
R epublic.13 H ow ever, he sees judicial review as a version o f the sam e philosophy.
His argum ents suggest that there is an inverse relationship betw een the pow er o f quaiguardians and the pow er o f a dem ocratic m ajority to control its ow n affairs. He
rejects the claim that judiciaries protect fundam ental rights above and beyond w hat a
federal legislature w ould d o .14 Dahl identifies several em pirical com parative studies
w hich indicate that polyarchies w ithout judicial branches and with the pow er to veto
legislative acts enjoy the same freedom as countries that do have such judiciaries.
H ow ever, Dahl concedes that judiciaries w ith veto pow er can be m ade com patible
w ith the dem ocratic process if their pow ers are lim ited to only ruling on issues that
deal w ith the protection o f fundam ental rights, such as free speech or p ress.15 In
general, D ah l’s argum ents highlight his continual concern with m ost processes which
lim it m ajority rule in any form. He again exhibits a philosophy that suggests he
supports dem ocratization o f the state [and other associations] far beyond w hat
M adison w ould have supported.
M any theorists have suggested that M adisonian factionalism represents a
fundam ental shift in the w ay political theorists view the role o f g overnm ent.16 M ost
political theorists from A ristotle to Rousseau believed that the purpose o f
governm ents was to develop citizens w ho w ould prom ote civic virtue. D ahl uses the

13 Plato argued that enlightened “philosopher-kings” should rule societies
because individuals in a dem ocracy failed to m ake good decisions.
14 D ahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 219.
15 Ibid., 342.

term “public good” in place o f civic virtue. H ow ever, M adison offered a system in
w hich all citizens did not need to w orry about the public good in order for the system
to be successful. This philosophy has been called the “politics o f interest.” M any o f
the political w riters o f the late 18lh century w ere influenced by the w ritings o f Adam
Sm ith. Like A dam Sm ith, M adison and many o f his contem poraries felt that
individuals pursuing their self-interest would, via an invisible hand, create a
collective civic v irtu e.17 Dahl is less sure. In D em ocracy and Its Critics, D ahl poses
the question, “If republican governm ent depends on the virtue o f its citizens, and if
virtue consists in dedication to the public good (rather than o n e's own interests), then
is a republic really possible?” In a short essay w ritten for a com m unitarian
publication, Dahl tries to answ er his own question and his answ er appears to be no. If
developing citizens w ith civic virtue is not possible, then “do the practices and
institutions o f m odem dem ocratic governm ents tend to produce the good-enough
citizen? The evidence suggests they do not.” 18 D ahl identifies three aspects o f
m odem dem ocracies that prevent civic virtue from developing. They are changes in
scale, an increase in com plexity, and an excessive am ount o f com m unication.
Political issues have becom e m ore com plex in m odem society. A lthough the level o f
education has also increased, it has not increased at the sam e rate as political
com plexity. As a result, people have a hard tim e discerning what is in the interest o f
the “public good.” Last, there is so m uch inform ation available today, the average

16 Banning, The Sacred Fire o f L iberty, 297.
17

A ppleby, C apitalism and the N ew Social O rder, 96.

citizen can not com prehend all o f it, and thus again he/she fails to understand what
m ay be in the interests o f the public good.
In order to illustrate his point and continue his criticism o f M adison, Dahl uses
the exam ple o f union and em ployee negotiators to highlight the fact that factionalism
does not prom ote civic virtue. He creates a scenario in w hich both groups becom e so
involved w ith their own interests they ignore the negative externalities their
agreem ents create. His conclusion is that ‘interest p o litics’ becom es less responsive
to the dem os as a w hole and that groups which do not have the resources to m obilize
are com pletely ignored.
Ironically, early in his career, D ahl was loudly criticized for ignoring
norm ative aspects o f his pluralism m odel. Such theorists as Theodore Low i .and Jack
W alker contend that w hat A dam Sm ith did to econom ics, Dahl did to p o litics.19
S m ith ’s invisible hand theory argued that self-interest w ould produce the public good.
In m any respects, Dahl argues early in his career that interest-group self-interest
com peting in a pluralist society will also produce the public good. H ow ever, Lowi
and W alker counter that such a model makes political science an am oral science.
O ther theorists have argued that D ahl’s focus on intensity belies im portant
ethical considerations. Prim arily, w hy should intensity be rew arded in a political
system ? Sim ply because a group has a more intense preference about an issue, does
not m ean they have a m oral claim to m ore consideration in the political process.
Professor Peters critiques Dahl by arguing that he is more concerned w ith stability

18 R obert Dahl, “Participation and the Problem o f Civic U nderstanding,”
Edited by A m itai Etzoni, Rights and the Common G ood(New York: St. M artins,
1995) 261-69.
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than ethical aspects o f dem ocracy. Dahl rew ards intense groups, not because they
have a m oral right to be heard, but because they m ay cause instability in the system.
Eventually D ahl’s scholarship does becom e m ore concerned with norm ative
issues o f dem ocracy and m any o f D ah l’s argum ents about civic virtue revolve around
a secondary issue, size. C ontrary to M adison, Dahl argues that a large republic will
have a detrim ental effect on civic virtue. He m akes the argum ent that as the size o f a
nation increases, so does the diversity o f a nation. This, how ever, reduces the sense
o f “com m unity” felt by the citizens. As people becom e m ore isolated and focused on
their ow n self-interests (as the M adisonian system encourages them to) they will have
a reduced sense o f civic virtue. He states,
As the num ber o f persons increases, know ledge o f the public good
necessarily becom es more theoretical and less practical. It becom es
m ore and m ore difficult for any citizen to know all the other citizens
concretely. The com m unity then is no longer a body o f an association
o f friends. It is an aggregate o f distant persons. How is a citizen to
apprehend the interests o f the people who com prise aggregates like these?20

D ah l’s argum ents about the public good lead him into his final confrontation
w ith M adison. Like M adison, Dahl is concerned with the concept o f how large a
dem ocratic nation can be and still be responsive to the populace. M adison is fam ous
for his argum ents that the republic should be large. In some respects, Dahl agrees.
H ow ever, D ahl has considerable trouble with the practice o f federalism . The concept
o f federalism , at least the form practiced in the U nited States, allows sm aller groups

19 Theodore Low i, The E nd o f Liberalism (New York: W .W . N orton & Co.,
1969).
20 R obert Dahl, “Participation and the Problem o f Civic U nderstanding,”
Edited by E tzoni, Rights and the Com m on G ood, 26.
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to have final control o f specific parts o f the political ag en d a.'

For exam ple, it is

accepted practice to delegate most authority over public education to state
governm ents.

H ow ever, in doing so, the general populace must give up final control

over an issue that is im portant to the collective society. Yet, at the same tim e Dahl
also feels that federalism can prom ote civic virtue in the traditional republican sense.
As a result, D ahl does not reject federalism outright, but he is less convinced
o f its merits. His first argum ent is that federalism in not a prerequisite for a nation to
be dem ocratic. H e then flips his question by asking, “Are federalist nations
necessarily undem ocratic?” His response revolves around tw o issues. The first is his
insistence that in dem ocratic countries, the entire d e m o s '' m ust have the ability to set
the political agenda. “Y et in a federal system ,” he argues,
no single body o f citizens can exercise control over the agenda.
D o n ’t you agree, then, that in a federal system the processes
by w hich the people govern them selves can ’t even in principle
ever be fully dem o cratic?'3
He follow s up his question w ith a hypothetical situation. A ssum e that the general
populace o f the federal nation Sylvania w ishes to deal with its pollution problem s.

-1M adison accepts specific pow er delegations to the state as a positive
developm ent. In F ederalist # 46, he notes that strong states will have the ability to
check the pow er o f an encroaching federal governm ent. M adison’s argum ents pose
an interesting question w ith respect to this thesis. It will later be argued that small
m inority factions som etim es have the ability to overw helm an apathetic m ajority.
Ignoring em pirical questions for the m om ent, the norm ative aspects w ould focus on
the question, is it ethical for intense m inorities to veto apathetic m ajorities.
M adison’s acceptance o f a federalist system , in w hich m inority populations in states
can at tim es overpow er m ajorities at the federal level, i.e.,(education issues), suggests
he w ould be am enable to such an argument.
" By w hich D ahl means all o f the populace, not ju st certain sub groups (states)
in a political system .
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One initiative is to ban strip m ining in all of Sylvania. H ow ever, one province,
Carbonia, w ithin Sylvania, w here m ining is crucial to the econom y, is opposed to
such controls over their vital industry. If the province o f C arbonia has the final say,
and can exercise a m inority veto, then Dahl argues that the nation o f Sylvania is not
fully dem ocratic. In a real w orld exam ple, Dahl suggests that the inability o f blacks
to acquire civil rights in the southern states before the 1960s is an exam ple of
undem ocratic federalism in action.
Dahl is not absolute in his attitude tow ards federalism . Speaking again in a
hypothetical sense, D ahl asks “is a system more dem ocratic to the extent that it
perm its citizens to govern them selves on m atters that are im portant to them ?” Such a
question assum es that “ m atters that are im portant” will m ost likely occur at the local
level. This raises the question as to w hether people are better represented via a local
governm ent. In an article about M ikhial G orbachev’s inability to prevent the Baltic
republics from seceding from the Soviet Union, D ahl adm its that m ajority rule does
not always w ork in a federal governm ent. He questions,
Should it [m ajority rule] obligate those who refuse their consent, not
because they deny the validity o f m ajority rule w ithin a properly
constituted dem ocratic unit but because the political unit is itself
seen as illegitim ate.24
Speaking on behalf o f a hypothetical Lithuanian, he states, “O f course I believe in
majority rule, but the only m ajority I will agree to obey is a m ajority o f my people in
m y country, (or state)” Dahl concedes that in federal system s the appropriate
m ajorities are som etim es found in state, provincial or cantonal units.

' D ahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 199.
24 R obert Dahl, “D em ocracy, M ajority Rule and G orbachev’s R eform s”
D issent (Fall 91): 491.

Dahl then highlights the problem s with his ow n argum ent. First, if dem ocratic
theory posits that sm aller units are the best venues for deciding issues w hich are
im portant to them , can those sm aller units again be subdivided? How long can this
process continue? Eventually, Dahl foresees a possibility o f justifying anarchism.
Second, m inorities are not necessarily geographic m inorities. In dem ocratic
countries, there is a m inority view on every political issue. Dahl concludes w ith this
argument,
If m inorities w ere to have an absolute right to form an association
independent o f the larger group, at lest on m atters m ost im portant
to them, either that right w ould have to be restricted arbitrarily to
the m em bers o f m inorities occupying an identifiable piece o f ground
or else the right w ould apply equally to m inorities o f all kinds.25
In the end, D ahl is perplexed by the sam e issues that confronted M adison. If a system
dem ands pure m ajoritarian rule, the rights o f m inority groups are in danger. Yet, any
attem pt to create sub-system s that protect m inority interests run the danger o f
destroying the dem ocratic process, supporting anarchism and allow ing for a the
possibility o f m inority tyranny. O f course, neither M adison nor Dahl argue that the
creation o f sub-system s is the only w ay to protect m inority rights.

DAHL’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY
On one level, D ahl is considered a critic o f M adison. H owever, on a another
level, Dahl is sim ply updating M adisonian dem ocracy. W hen com paring the works
and philosophies o f the tw o men, it becom es apparent that both theorists were
affected by their environm ent. M adison was w riting at a tim e in Am erican history
when the society w as predom inantly agrarian. Furtherm ore, m ost o f the Founding
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Fathers believed that the g o vernm ent's involvem ent in the redistribution o f wealth
w ould be lim ited.26 In the late 1700s, the federal g overnm ent’s ability to tax and
spend was extrem ely sm all when com pared to the 1900’s. If anything, most
republicans o f the era feared that governm ent m ight be used to prevent the acquisition
o f w ealth.27 They did not foresee the m odem w elfare state in w hich governm ent
becam e a m ajor source o f w ealth. It was the predom inant b elief o f the era that
econom ics was a self-regulating system. As a result, governm ent’s role in econom ics
was confined to regulating interstate com m erce, providing stable m arkets and
creating uniform rules to the econom ic system.
In contrast, D ahl is w riting after the industrial revolution has changed the face
o f A m erican society. B y the 1950s, A m erica is an industrialized and urbanized
nation. In D ah l’s world, the governm ent is deeply involved in regulating the
econom y, redistributing w ealth and the federal budget accounts for approxim ately
33% o f the Gross N ational Product. Furtherm ore, Dahl is keenly aw are o f the
unequal distribution o f w ealth in the United States. H e lives in N ew Haven,
Connecticut, a town w ith extrem e wealth and extrem e poverty. The differences
betw een M adison’s environm ent and D ahl’s environm ent m ay account for their
different interpretations o f dem ocracy.

25 Ibid., 493.
Joyce A ppleby, Capitalism and the N ew Social O rder, 88.
27 Ibid., 34.

The inequality o f w ealth caused by m odem econom ic system s influenced
70
D ahl’s to focus his concern on the concept o f “intensity o f preference.”' D em ocratic

procedures do not record how intensely a citizen prefers option A over option B. In
contrast, in the m arket system , we can not only determ ine that a person may prefer
product A over product B, but we can also determ ine the level o f preference by noting
how much m ore a person is w illing to pay for product B. H ow ever, a vote by itself
does not record intensity. In essence, political equality, “one man, one vote” denies a
citizen the ability to register w hether he/she slightly prefers option A to option B or
w hether he/she is ready to revolt if option A is not chosen over option B.
By m aking ‘m ost preferred’ equivalent to ‘preferred by m o st’ we
deliberately bypassed a crucial problem : w hat if the m inority of
voters prefers its alternative m uch more passionately that the m ajority
prefers a contrary alternative? Does the m ajority principle still make
r,29
sense?
Dahl is asking a norm ative question. D o intense m inorities have m ore rights than
apathetic m inorities or apathetic m ajorities? M ore im portantly, should dem ocratic
system s allow for som e institutional process to account for intense m inorities? If the
answ er to these questions is yes, then som ething besides m ajority rule m ust be
developed in dem ocratic states. Dahl calls such a rule the Q ualified M inority Rule. It
w ould allow for intense m inorities to prevail over m ajorities in specific instances.
H ow ever, Dahl understands the difficulties w ith such a concept. Prim arily, how does
one m easure intensity? H ow much m ore intense does the preference have to be in
order to justify denying the m ajority its preference?

->o

" Sim ilarly, Calhoun focused on the sam e concept during the years prior to
the Civil War.
29 R obert Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 52.
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Dahl fails to ask a m ore im portant question. By creating a “Q ualified
M inority R ule” he is creating his ow n version o f m inority tyranny, a concept for
w hich he roundly criticizes M adison for doing. In fact, critics o f Dahl have gone so
far as to suggest that pluralism is nothing more than M ad iso n 's factionalism dressed
up in behavioral jarg o n .30
H ow ever, in this instance, Dahl asks these questions, not because he is critical
o f M adison, but because he w ants to understand how the dem ocratic process actually
w orks, not how theorists believe it should work. His m ajor criticism o f populist
dem ocracy is that as a theory, it fails to predict political behavior and the governm ent
decision m aking process.31 D ahl is quick to note that M adisonian dem ocracy did not
prevent the Civil W ar. The issues surrounding the Civil W ar attracted high levels o f
political participation and extrem ely intense view s on both sides. M ajority rule did
not keep the South in the Union and m inority protections did not alleviate fears by
southerners that their rights w ould not be protected. In contrast, the W hiskey
Rebellion, also an exam ple o f an intense m inority disagreeing w ith federal policy, did
not lead to a schism in A m erican society deep enough to threaten the Union. Dahl
argues that differences in the size o f m inorities, the intensity in w hich m inorities and
m ajorities hold their beliefs are all part o f understanding how the dem ocratic process
works. In D ilem m as o f P luralist D em ocracy he asks.
Political conflicts form patterns o f such bew ildering variety as to defy a
concise sum m ary. H ow strong or intense is the antagonism between the
contestants? D o they see one another as enem ies locked in a struggle for
survival, or at the other extrem e as friends, or fellow citizens who have
a tem porary disagreem ent?
30 John Peters, “Political Theory, Political Science, and The Preface,” 172.
31 R obert Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 51.

Dahl turns his focus to the question o f w hether M adison’s system protects
intense m inorities. He suggests that this jo b will typically fall to the Suprem e Court.
In an em pirical study o f Suprem e C ourt cases in which the court reversed legislative
action, Dahl draw s a few conclusions. He notes that in about tw o-thirds o f the cases
in w hich the Suprem e C ourt found law s unconstitutional, the m ajority m ust have been
apathetic because no further action w as taken to re-enact the law via other strategies.
H owever, he questions him self as to how accurate a m easuring stick such a study is.
Just because the Suprem e C ourt strikes a law dow n, thus favoring the m inority, does
that necessarily m ean that the m inority was an intense minority. In other w ords, is a
Suprem e Court action an indicator o f the intensity o f m inorities or an indicator o f the
apathy o f m ajorities? Second, in the rem aining one-third o f the cases found
unconstitutional, the judicial veto w as overcom e by other m eans, in one case, civil
war. But even in these cases, the court was successful in delaying m any policies
advocated by a m ajority but intensely opposed by a m inority.32 D ahl concludes that
intense m inorities are protected in dem ocratic nations that em ploy judicial review.
Dahl focuses on intensity because he seeks to understand why dem ocratic
institutions have succeeded in some nations and failed in others. W hy is it that most
W estern European nations along w ith the United States can endure w ith dem ocratic
system s and other nations, with equally well w ritten constitutions, fail to endure? His
answ er to this question will lead Dahl to develop the theory o f Polyarchy, the model
o f dem ocracy m ost associated w ith D ahl.

■ See Lochner and Slaughterhouse cases.

It is clear that Dahl is uncom fortable w ith the term dem ocracy. In m ost
instances, he qualifies the term when he does use it. He notes, “the term dem ocracy
is like an ancient kitchen mitten packed w ith assorted leftovers from tw enty-five
hundred years o f nearly continual usage.”33 T o D ahl, dem ocracy has two
interpretations. D em ocracy as an ideal and dem ocracy as it actually exists in the real
w orld. The ideal dem ocracy w ould include perfect equality in voting, equal
opportunities for all citizens to participate and affect the process, “perfect
understanding” or inform ation about all issues, exact control o f the political agenda
and com plete inclusion o f all adult citizens.34 H ow ever. Dahl understands that in the
real w orld such expectations are alm ost im possible, and com pletely im possible in
nations o f considerable size. Therefore, D ahl sees dem ocracy as a spectrum ranging
from existing nations with dem ocratic aspects to the ideal o f perfect dem ocracy.
Polyarchy represents w hat Dahl sees as the predom inant form o f dem ocracy in the
w orld today. Thus, inherent in the term polyarchy is the assum ption that nations need
to becom e m ore dem ocratic. Polyarchy is only a description o f a dem ocratic nation
that could develop into a nation closer to ideal dem ocracy.35
D ahl’s first three requirem ents for polyarchy to exist are that people m ust
have the right to vote, all votes m ust be given equal w eight and that the option with
the m ost votes be enacted into governm ent policy.36 In order to separate polyarchy

D ahl, “Justifying D em ocracy” , 5.
34 D ahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 71.
35 Ibid., 74.
36 R obert D ahl, D ilem m as in a Pluralist D em ocracy, 36.

from a totalitarian governm ent which also allow s citizens to vote (although with
extrem ely lim ited options), Dahl insists that in a polyarchy citizens m ust have the
ability to insert options into the schedule of options. In other words, if option A and
option B are not acceptable, the citizen may insert option C. N ext, all voters must
have equal inform ation about all the options. D ahl concedes this is unrealistic, but as
a concept it m ust be prom oted as m uch as possible. D ahl, in later w orks, w ill refer to
fundam ental rights necessary for dem ocracies to function, such as freedom o f press
and speech.
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B y protecting these fundam ental rights, there is a greater likelihood o f

equal inform ation.

W hat separates polyarchy from a m ore ideal form o f dem ocracy is the
periodic nature o f elections. Dahl asserts that it is im possible to be com pletely
dem ocratic w hen decisions are m ade every day and elections only take place every
two to four years. Therefore, in a polyarchy, the decisions o f the electorate m ust be
carried out during the “interelection stage.” Dahl argues this will occur only if
representatives feel they are subject to punishm ent by the voters if they fail to carry
out the electorates’ will.
Dahl som ew hat com plicates his theory o f polyarchy by also referring to
interest groups w ithin a polyarchy as “polyarchies.” He states,
Polyarchies include a variety o f organizations w hich W estern political
scientists w ould ordinarily call dem ocratic, including certain aspects o f the
governm ents o f nation states such as the U nited States and G reat Britain;
states and provinces; num erous cities and tow ns; som e trade-union; num erous
77

At this point, it should be noted that polyarchy does not appear to be much
different than M adisonian dem ocracy. Other than increasing support for
m ajoritariansim , polyarchy seem s not to be a radical departure from factionalism .
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associations such as Parent-Teacher A ssociations, chapters o f the League
o f W om en voters and religious groups. Thus it follow s that the num ber of
polyarchies is large.'
■)o

He also asserts that w hile independent organizations are not sufficient to produce
polyarchy, they are a necessary elem ent of a large-scale dem ocratic nation. In fact,
he argues that autonom ous organizations are both a prerequisite and a consequence of
polyarchy.39
Dahl also describes the conditions necessary for polyarchies to develop. It is
at this stage o f his theory that he begins to diverge from M adison. Dahl insists that
polyarchy will only develop in societies where there already exists a consensus of
norm s. He argues that M adison and others took for granted that m ost people in the
U nited States at the tim e the Constitution was ratified had relatively sim ilar views on
natural rights, hum an nature and social norms. D ahl states, “I believe, [the consensus
o f norms] hindered realistic and precise thinking about the requirem ents o f
dem ocracy.”40 In other w ords, m ajority tyranny never developed in the U nited States
because m ost people had sim ilar values about m ost issues. It w as not a result o f
M adison’s elaborate system o f m inority protections. D ahl feels the Civil W ar proves
his point. D uring the C ivil W ar there was a fundam ental and uncom prom ising
disagreem ent over values in the United States, and the M adisonian system failed to
produce a solution.

io

R obert D ahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 74.
39 John M anely, “N eo Pluralism : A Class A nalysis o f Pluralism I and
P luralism II” A m erican Political Science Review (Fall 1983): 369.
40 Ibid., 369.
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Polyarchy has a variety of m eanings for D ahl. In one respect, polyarchy is a
set o f institutions w hich fosters a relatively dem ocratic political system. Dahl, in his
concern for being em pirical, wants to be able to identify tangible institutions (as listed
above). Therefore, by exam ining a political system he can em pirically determ ine if
that system qualifies for polyarchal status.
Polyarchy is also an environm ent. D ahl argues that polyarchy can only exist
in a hom ogeneous political environm ent. As the severity and intensity o f
disagreem ents increases in a polyarchy, thus creating the possibility o f a perm anent
and dissatisfied m inority, polyarchy becom es less likely. By creating a m ultiple
definition o f polyarchy, D ahl wants polyarchy to becom e both an ends and a means.
Polyarchy needs to create institutions to carry out a dem ocratic process, but at the
same time, needs to create an environm ent that fosters sim ilar values.
Finally, polyarchy is an evolutionary process. Dahl feels that polyarchy is one
step in the process o f dem ocratization. Polyarchies foster a dem ocratic environm ent
on the political level. H ow ever, Dahl hopes that in such an environm ent the political
process will evolve into a more “purely” dem ocratic system . Such a process would
allow for the dem ocratization o f econom ic firm s.
Because polyarchy, as an environm ent, postulates a consensus o f norm s, Dahl
contends that the checks and balances system o f the U nited States Constitution also
does nothing to prevent tyranny o f the m ajority. He states,
M adison’s com prom ise betw een the pow er o f m ajorities and the pow er of
m inorities rested in large part, upon the existence o f constitutional checks
upon m ajority action. As distinguished from M adisonianism , the theory of
polyarchy focuses prim arily not on the constitutional prerequisites but on
the social prerequisites for a dem ocratic order.

Dahl contends that as nations becom e more heterogeneous, with respect to values,
there is less likelihood that stable dem ocracies will develop. Or. as nations becom e
more heterogeneous, independent groups will have m ore autonom y within society.
At this point, one can see w hy Dahl was not w illing to com pletely rule out the process
of federalism or m inority rule in certain instances. It also becom es clear as to why
Dahl was concerned w ith the concept o f intensity. As passionate cleavages develop
in dem ocracies, the less likely they are to survive. “In a sense,” Dahl concludes in A
Preface to D em ocratic Theory, “w hat we ordinarily describe as dem ocratic politics is
m erely the chaff. It is the surface m anifestation, representing superficial conflicts.”41
In other w ords, that the reason A m erican dem ocracy has survived is because o f a lack
o f intense disagreem ents, not because o f checks and balances or m inority vetoes.
The theory o f polyarchy sets up a very narrow spectrum in which M adison’s
view o f factionalism and D ahl’s view o f polyarchy can co-exist. M adison argues that
a variety o f independent interests (factions) w ith divergently different goals must
continually com pete w ith one another to prevent tyranny o f the majority.

Dahl

counters that the divergently different goals m ust not be too divergent or else
polyarchy will not develop. In essence, polyarchy is a function o f consensus.
However, Dahl accepts M adison’s contention that pluralism is necessary for
dem ocracies to exist on a large geographic scale. Therefore, in order for both theories
to be com patible, interest groups must com pete and disagree with each other, but at
the sam e tim e there m ust be underlying values that all interest groups hold as true,
regardless o f their “superficial” disagreem ents.

41 R obert D ahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 124.

49

Up to this point, tw o aspects o f D ahl’s political theories have been discussed.
First, Dahl believes that societies can and should becom e m ore dem ocratic. Second,
polyarchy does not describe an ideal dem ocracy. It describes a stage in dem ocratic
developm ent. W ithin that second concept is the im plication that polyarchies need to
undergo som e form o f transition that will bring about a m ore dem ocratic society.
Dahl additionally feels that unequal distribution o f w ealth is the prim ary
im pedim ent to a fully dem ocratic society. In the 1950s, Dahl along with his most
frequent collaborator, C harles Lindblom , revised the theory o f pluralism .42 They
argued that pluralism best described “pow er relationships” w ithin the United States
and m ost polyarchies. The basic tenets o f pluralism w ere 1) pow er was tam ed and
coercion m inim ized; 2) the consent o f all citizens was prom oted; 3) the system forced
peaceful settlem ents o f all contending parties; and 4) the political system was open to
m ost interests if the interests felt strongly enough to m obilize pressure.43 However,
the perform ance o f the political econom y in the U nited States from the 1950s to the
1980s so concerned D ahl and Lindblom , in that the gap betw een the righ and poor
was ever w idening, that they began to revise their theory o f pluralism . They began to
insist that w ealth m ust be redistributed in order for polyarchies to survive, at w orst, or
to transform into m ore dem ocratic societies, at best.
D ahl’s revision o f pluralism is initiated by his separation o f capitalism from
polyarchy.44 H istorically, the tw o had always been tied together. In their jo in t effort

42 Ibid., 372.
43 John M anely, “N eo Pluralism : A Class A nalysis o f Pluralism I and
Pluralism II” , 391.
44 Ibid., 3 9 1 .
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in 1953, Politics E conom ics and W elfare, D ahl and Lindblom assert a variety o f
arguments, all o f w hich suggest lim iting the private control o f capital, lim iting the
influence o f business in politics and redistributing w ealth m ore equally.
In the realm o f attitudes and ideology, we A m ericans have an irrational
com m itm ent to private ow nership and control o f econom ic enterprises
that prevents us from thinking clearly about econom ic arrangem ents,
private ow nership and control is but one form am ong a vast variety o f
options.45
They continue,
To dem ocratize the A m erican polyarchy further will require a redistribution
of w ealth and incom e. It follows from all we have said that we believe that
m ajor structural reform s are required in the A m erican politico-econom ic
system. 46
Dahl is not calling for a redistribution o f wealth strictly on grounds o f social justice.
Dahl is first and forem ost a student o f dem ocratic theory. He views inequality o f
wealth as a disturbance to dem ocratic systems.
Pluralism is based on the idea o f com petition am ong groups, interests and the
varying elites. H ow ever, econom ic pow er distorts the ability of all groups to com pete
fairly. This is D ah l’s m ajor concern.
B usinessm en play a distinctive role in polyarchal politics that is
quantitatively different from that of any interest group. It is also much
more pow erful than any other interest group. C om m on interpretations
that depict the A m erican or any other m arket-oriented system as a
com petition am ong interest groups are seriously in error for their
failure to take account o f the distinctive privileged position o f
businessm en in politics.47
If the com petition in the political m arketplace is not fair, then groups in pow er will
remain in pow er. Interests that are already w ealthy will stay wealthy. This is what

45 R obert Dahl and Charles Lindblom . P olitics, Econom ics and Welfare, 111.
46 Ibid., x x x v ii.

Dahl refers to as stabilizing inequality. H owever, he is not strictly speaking about
econom ic inequality. He also m eans political inequality,
An evident feature o f the consensus prevailing in all polyarchies is that
it endorses attitudes, values, and policies o f m ore benefit to the already
favored groups in the society than to the less favored. Because
governm ents respond m ore to the better-off than the w orse-off. they
help to sustain the cycles o f political effectiveness and ineffectuality
that in turn perpetuate the structural inequalities.48
Dahl therefore concludes that pluralism , in the traditional sense, has not achieved the
goals that he once hoped dem ocracy would achieve. First, Dahl had hoped that
polyarchies, in term s o f process, w ould eventually transform into m ore dem ocratic
states. Second, in term s o f an ends, he hoped polyarchies w ould distribute wealth
m ore evenly. H ow ever, the opposite is occurring.
In D em ocracy, L iberty an d Equality and A Preface to Econom ic D em ocracy
Dahl continues to focus on the theoretical aspects o f econom ic equality. Dahl finds
him self confronted with the sam e dilem m as as M adison and D eTocquville; equality
and liberty are not alw ays com patible forces. In fact, in m any cases, liberty is
antagonistic to equality. D ahl is confronted with the paradox. He feels that
dem ocratization o f our society m ust increase. He also argues that dem ocratization
cannot increase unless there is a m ore equal distribution o f econom ic resources.
H owever, in order to equalize w ealth, society usually m ust lim it liberty. Dahl poses
the question, “can we create econom ic equality with out destroying political liberty?
Or, is there an unavoidable trad e-o ff betw een the tw o?”
Dahl begins his analysis by re-exam ining D eTocquville's assertion that
dem ocracy can be dangerous to property rights. In essence, D eTocquville repeats

47 R obert Dahl, A Preface to Econom ic D em ocracy, 143.
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M adiso n ’s fears that a m ajority o f low er-class citizens can dem ocratically initiate an
egalitarian revolution 49 W hat prevents this from happening, Dahl argues, is that
property rights are viewed as a fundam ental right and are, therefore, beyond the
jurisdiction o f m ajority rule. He argues that “A m ericans capitalism rests ultim ately
on an inalienable right o f [property]” He continues, “A m erican beliefs about
inalienable rights to life, liberty, and - the last o f the constitutional trio— property” 50
are preventing the further developm ent o f dem ocracy.
D ahl’s solution is to assert that dem ocracy itself is a fundam ental right. In
essence, he seeks to m ake the right to “dem ocratic control” superior to the right to
private property. “W hat my argum ent does is to establish a claim to dem ocracy as a
m atter o f right in any [D ahl’s italics] association o f any kind.”51 Dahl is not only
asserting that the right to m ajority rule is superior to the right o f private property, he
is also asserting that any organization, w hich meets certain criteria, should be
dem ocratically governed. Such an argum ent allow s for the next logical step. If
political associations should be dem ocratically governed, then as a m atter o f course,
econom ic firms should be dem ocratically governed.
One o f D ahl’s concerns is that econom ic firm s are inherently dictatorial in the
w ay they function, i.e. w orkers have little to no im pact on how decisions are made
w ithin the firm. Furtherm ore, A m ericans accept this as the proper arrangem ent for

48 Ibid., 145.
49 Alex D eTocquville, D em ocracy in A m erica (Boston: Penguin B ooks, 1961),
298.
50 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Econom ic D emocracy, 56.
51 Ibid.,61.

econom ic associations.1’2 If all econom ic firms are allow ed to rem ain undem ocratic in
the way they function, polyarchies will never m ake the leap to a more dem ocratic
society. He argues,
But I do not see how private ow nership o f corporate enterprise can be a
fundam ental m oral right. To reach such a conclusion requires jum ping a
series o f logical hurdles. Even if we w ere to assum e that everyone has
a fundam ental right to econom ic liberty, it w ould not follow that
everyone has a fundam ental right to private property. To assert that
private property is a natural right is to say close to nothing at all.33
Dahl follows up this argum ent w ith the conclusion that if dem ocracy is an acceptable
process for governing the state, then it m ust also be justified in governing econom ic
enterprises.54 C onversely, if dem ocracy is not acceptable for governing the econom ic
firm then it m ust not be good enough to govern the state.
Dahl attem pts to avoid the socialist label. D espite support for progressive tax
policies, strong union pow er, and an involved w elfare state, he does not support
“direct redistribution.” On a practical level, Dahl does not believe A m ericans can
m ake the mental shift to “distributive ju stice” after so long an historical experience to
the contrary. Second, he feels such changes are unlikely “in an A m erican system
w here intense m inorities are pow erful.” 55 H owever, he is w illing to prom ote
dem ocratic control o f corporate capitalism in the nam e o f substantive equality in
order to control the ill effects o f capitalism on individual liberty. In doing so, he
hopes that dem ocracy can spread to all aspects o f hum an organization. In some ways,

52 Ibid., 55.
53 Ibid., 74.
54Ibid., 111.
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D ahl sounds like a m odem day M adison. Just as M adison did not w ant to elim inate
liberty as a m ethod o f elim inating factions. Dahl does not w ant to elim inate
capitalism as a m ethod for elim inating inequalities in w ealth. M adison tried to
control the effects o f faction w ithin a free society as Dahl tries to control the effects
o f inequality w ithin a capitalist society. Dahl criticizes M adison by questioning
w hether a system that so stringently protects m inorities is still dem ocratic. However,
one could question w hether a system in w hich private property is no longer a
fundam ental right is still capitalistic.

AREAS OF AGREEEMENT BETWEEN DAHL AND MADISON
D espite the fact that D ahl is considered by m any to be a critic o f M adison,
both men hold sim ilar view s on m any significant issues concerning dem ocratic
theory. In fact, Dahl and M adison were more alike than different. Dahl sets out to
construct a model to explain how dem ocracies actually function. In doing so, he finds
that M adison failed to understand several aspects o f dem ocratic system s. M adison,
Dahl claim s, focused too m uch on the possibility o f tyranny o f the m ajority, granted
an inordinate am ount o f pow er to m inorities and thus created a system that was only
m arginally dem ocratic. Furtherm ore, Dahl argues that M adison did not understand
the social conditions necessary for dem ocracy to flourish. As a result, Dahl feels that
M adison put too much faith in structural m ethods to prevent tyranny o f the m ajority
and m inority and ignored the fact that social hom ogeneity was a prim ary requirem ent
for dem ocracy.

55 Ibid., 163.

H ow ever, even if one accepts all of D ah l’s criticism s o f M adison, it is
im possible to ignore the fact that pluralism , as defined by Dahl, is not radically
different than factionalism as described by M adison. In the sam e vein, M adison may
not have advocated that dem ocracy should or will pervade all aspects o f society, but it
is not accurate to label him an anti-dem ocrat. A close reading o f M adison’s notes at
the Federal C onvention, along w ith letters he w rote to fellow leaders dem onstrates he
was a strong advocate o f dem ocracy. Finally, the fact that M adison and D ahl both
focus on sim ilar difficulties w ith dem ocratic theory suggests that they w ere looking at
dem ocracy through a sim ilar lens. Both theorists were concerned with small groups.
M adison tried to protect sm all groups and individuals from factions, especially to
protect their individual liberties. Dahl tried to protect society from small groups with
inordinate am ounts o f power. In their separate w ays, they both w anted to account for
intense m inorities within a greater system. As a result, they w ere both concerned with
the concept o f size and struggled w ith the prospect o f extending dem ocracy to a large
and diverse society.
Dahl states that pluralist dem ocracies face a constant contradiction. On one
hand, individual groups m ust have autonom y or liberty. A t the sam e time, groups
m ust be controlled in order to prevent them from doing harm to them selves or
society. A ccording to D ahl, “autonom ous organizations” exist if organizations can
“undertake actions that 1) are considered harmful by other organizations and that 2)
no other organization can prevent the [other] actor from doing so.” And if groups are
autonom ous, “ the problem o f dem ocratic pluralism is serious precisely because
independent organizations are highly desirable and at the same time their
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independence allow s them to do harm .”56 The w ords may be different, but the
argum ents and definitions are the sam e as those presented in Federalist # 10.
M adison also w orries about autonom ous groups tendencies to sacrifice the public
good for their own benefit, but he calls these groups factions. And, like Dahl,
M adison argues that despite the possible danger factions pose, they m ust be allowed
to exist and to flourish.
H ow ever, w hen com petition between factions begins to deteriorate the
consensus o f values a political system m aintains, Dahl contends that stable polyarchy
is threatened. In such a case, Dahl typically recom m ends consociational form s of
dem ocracy as a solution. He argues that w here a collection o f diverse m inorities all
occupy the sam e geographic location and are all ruled by the sam e governm ent, some
type o f corporate system becom es necessary to prevent tyranny o f the m inority or
political gridlock. H ow ever, to argue that each sub-system or significant interest in
the consensus m odel has the pow er to veto collective decisions is not m uch different
than M adison’s provisions for m inority vetoes to prevent tyranny o f the majority;
provisions o f w hich Dahl is very critical.
Again, if one looks at D ahl’s argum ents about “corporate capitalism ,” he
appears to agree w ith M adison more than he disagrees. Dahl argues that since the
developm ent o f corporate capitalism , econom ic w ealth is now equitable w ith political
power. He goes on to suggest that since M adison and m ost o f the other Founders did
not foresee a change in A m erican society from agrarian to industrial, they did not
foresee the destruction o f political equality. H owever, there is evidence to suggest
that M adison w as concerned about the effects o f property on voting equality. On July

56 Robert Dahl, D dilem m as in a P lu ralist D em oicracy. 1 ‘63.
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26, M adison m oved to strike the word “landed” before the word “qualifications" in
the passage concerning suffrage rights in the Constitution. He argues, “unjust laws o f
the States had proceeded from this class o f [landed] men than any other. It was
politics as well as justice that the interests o f every class should be duly represented
and understood in the councils.”57 In all, M adison was a dem ocrat. As a college
student during initial stages o f the R evolutionary W ar, he, like m ost college students,
developed radical (at the tim e) views about dem ocracy. H owever, m any o f those
views were eventually tem pered by his experience as a delegate to the C ontinental
Congress during the darker tim es o f the war. It m ight be more accurate to suggest
that M adison was an advocate o f slow and m oderate dem ocracy, not an anti
dem ocrat.
In developing his theory o f polyarchy, Dahl presents the idea that what
separates M adisonian thinking from his own is the concept o f social checks on
tyranny o f the m ajority. D ahl feels that M adison placed too m uch faith in structural
and institutional checks as a m eans for preventing m ajority and m inority tyranny.
Dahl feels that, in the end, a hom ogeneous culture is the only true m eans o f
preventing tyranny, H ow ever, in a letter to Jefferson in 1788, M adison provides
som e evidence that he m ight agree with Dahl:
R epeated violations o f these parchm ent barriers have been com m itted by
overbearing m ajorities in every state. In V irginia I have seen the bill o f rights
violated in every instance where it has been opposed to a popular current.
N otw ithstanding the explicit provision contained in that instrum ent for the
rights o f conscience, it is well know n that a religious establishm ent w ould
have taken place in that state if the legislative m ajority had found a m ajority
o f the people in favor o f the m easure. W herever the real pow er o f the
governm ent lies, there is the danger o f oppression. In our governm ents the real
pow er lies in the m ajority o f the com m unity, and the invasion o f private rights
57 Jam es M adison, The jo u rn a l o f the F ederal Convention, 119.
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is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts o f governm ent contrary to the
sense o f its constituents, but from acts in w hich the governm ent is the m ere
58
instrum ent o f the m ajor num ber o f the constituents.'
C O N C L U S IO N S
H aving exam ined the works and philosophies o f both theorists, are there any
general conclusions one can draw in com paring M adison and Dahl? M adison had a
pressing jo b to do: draft a new constitution w ith a stronger national government.
D ahl’s intention is to create a theoretical model that, hopefully, will make an
intellectual contribution to dem ocratic theory. M adison had to be much m ore
concerned w ith practical and realistic aspects o f creating a governm ent from scratch.
He had spent a considerable am ount o f time studying old system s o f governm ent in
order to discern the strengths and w eaknesses o f each. W hen M adison attended the
Constitutional convention, he inherited a diverse nation, w ith pre-existing prejudices
left over from the Revolution. M adison’s audiance had an expectation for popular
sovereignty and dem anded that certain “natural rights” be protected. They also had
loyalties to pre-existing state governm ents. He was forced to accept com prom ises
and adapt to the environm ent in w hich he >vas w orking. As the nation he help create
grew and faced unforeseen challenges, M adison was forced to amend his political
views with w hat he thought w ould be politically successful and institutionally
healthy.
Dahl, on the other hand, is w orking in a m ore intellectual arena. He is
allowed to indulge in purely norm ative questions. H e has the freedom to envision an
“ideal dem ocracy” and argue the m erits o f such a system . He is not constrained by

58 Sm ith, Peter. A R epublic o f Letters, pg. 503.

any know ledge that he m ight have to actually create his ideal system. He, from time
to tim e, will offer suggestions to im prove M adison’s system , but he is never called
upon to draft a national charter. As a result, Dahl has the luxury o f being able to call
for dem ocratic socialism w ith-out having to provide the sam e level o f specifics that
M adison w as forced to provide in the V irginia Plan. M adison was not able to call for
m inority protections, on a theoretical basis, and then leave the details up to others. In
an ironic tw ist, it is D ahl w hose accuses M adison o f not being practical. Dahl argues
that it was M adison w ho relied too m uch on vague notions o f “natural rights” and
“tyranny.” H ow ever, m any critics o f Dahl suggest he suffers from the sam e malady.
W hen Dahl is trying to be em pirical, in m any w ays he is sim ply referring to other
theorists. “H is em pirical w orld, how ever” as Lucian Pye writes, “is largely o f the
realities described by the literature o f Plato, A ristotle, Pareto, M orasca and other
num erous w orthies.”39 “Considering how closely the author [Dahl] is identified with
behaviorlism ,” Jack N agel (1991) adds, “one is struck by how much o f D em ocracy
and its C ritics reads like the w ork o f a philosopher.”60
A second conclusion one could draw about the two theorists is that M adison
was a dem ocrat w ho em phasized the lim itations o f dem ocracy and Dahl w as the
dem ocrat w ho em phasized the potential o f dem ocracy. It could be argued that
M adison was trying to construct a dem ocratic system into som ething that was
practical and lasting, w hile Dahl was trying to reconstruct this dem ocratic system so
as to elim inate m any o f the roadblocks M adison had created. M adison appears more
aw are than D ahl o f the frailties and vices o f people. He develops his plan for a

59 Luciano Pye, “Review of D em ocracy and Its C ritic,” 628.
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dem ocratic republic with this darker im age o f man prom inent in his mind. His
analysis o f factions suggest that one o f the m ost dangerous entities a people will face
in a dem ocratic system is the people them selves. Like other Federalists, M adison
seeks to protect the people from them selves.
Dahl seeks to expand dem ocracy to a new level o f inclusion. Dahl professes
as his goal “to close the gap betw een polyarchy and dem ocracy." Dahl view s the
developm ent o f dem ocracy in an evolutionary prospective. A ccording to Dahl,
dem ocracy was born in the G reek city-states and has slow ly been evolving into
som ething bigger and better. H ow ever, he assum es that dem ocracy has not finished
grow ing. He envisions a “third transform ation” that will allow dem ocracy to spread
to the w orld o f econom ic associations. Som e critics have suggested that D ah l’s use
o f the term polyarchy allow s him to reserve the term ‘dem ocracy’ for norm ative use
as a set o f unrealized goals. In this way, M adison and Dahl can be com pared, in a
norm ative and em pirical sense, with respect to the extent dem ocracy should pervade a
political and econom ic systems.
This contention leads to a third conclusion that can be draw about the two
theorists. M adison seeks to place fundam ental rights on a “higher plane” than the
dem ocratic decision-m aking process. That is, he believes that certain rights are
inherent or “natural rights,” and even fundam ental to the survival o f dem ocracy and
therefore not subject to m ajority rule. This argum ent becom es m ost clear in the
debate over property rights. It w ould probably be fair to say that M adison felt that the
right to property was superior to m ajority rule. Therefore, he w ould probably argue
that m ajority rule should not be able to deprive a citizen o f his control o f econom ic

60 Jack Nagle, “Review S ym posium ,” 218.
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resources. H ow ever, Dahl w ould contend that a right o f the people to dem ocratically
control all aspects o f their environm ent, including their econom ic environm ent, is a
fundam ental right w hich takes precedent over an individual’s property rights.
Dahl m ust create this hierarchy o f rights in order to justify his call for
dem ocratizing econom ic firm s. He m ust reconcile the age old tension betw een liberty
and equality. To accom plish this task, he m ust elevate the egalitarian aspects of
m ajority rule above the right to private property. By doing so, he can advocate forms
o f dem ocratic socialism w ith out violating “fundam ental rights.”
This difference o f opinion possibly springs from the fact that M adison was
w riting and developing his ideas about governm ent before the industrial revolution
affected A m erican society. He lived in an agrarian w orld that prevented large scale
class inequalities. Furtherm ore, he lived in a country w ith w hat seem ed to be an
expansive W estern frontier. These circum stances led M adison, and others o f his
tim e, to believe that regional and econom ic issues would be an aspect o f the
governm ental policy m aking process, but not necessarily the dom inant aspect. Dahl
is probably correct w hen he argues that the Founders did not foresee the extent to
w hich econom ics w ould play a role in the political process, especially after
industrialization.
Dahl view s the w orld from a different century. He feels econom ic inequality
is ram pant and econom ic pow er is political pow er. His view o f w ho holds the pow er
is com pletely reversed. He sees small m inorities, such as corporations and business
classes with inordinent econom ic pow er, oppressing the m ajority. As a result,
M adison spends m ost o f his efforts trying to protect m inority factions and Dahl
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spends considerable effort trying to justify m ajority rule to protect m ajority factions
from econom ically pow erful m inority factions.
Dahl is struck by the num erous paradoxes that large republics create. He
notes that there are incessant tradeoffs betw een desirable goals in large dem ocracies.
A short list includes the tradeoffs betw een unity and diversity, the com m on interest
and individual interests, and the control and the autonom y o f elected officials. Dahl
condenses all o f these contradictions into tw o concepts; citizen effectiveness and
capacity o f the system . Or, the more pow er individual citizens have, the less functions
a governm ent can serve.

He argues that as a system becom es larger, citizens lose the

ability to affect the political system to be responsive to their desires. A nd yet, as the
political system becom es stronger, the system acquires the ability to deal w ith larger
issues that are im portant to the populace. In other w ords, as Lincoln pointed out 100
years before Dahl in his G ettysburg A ddress, citizens are offered either control o f an
im potent state, or little control of a powerful state.
D ahl refers to the above dilem m a as the “problem o f the dem ocratic unit.” He
argues that one lim itation o f dem ocratic theory is that the dem ocratic process assum es
that a boundary in w hich the dem ocratic process will take place already exists.
H owever, the tension betw een citizen control and political effectiveness that Lincoln
and Dahl highlight suggest that m ultiple boundaries are necessary. Small boundaries
to ensure citizen effectiveness and a large boundary to ensure political effectiveness.
M adison’s solution was to codify the rules o f federalism in the Constitution.
A lthough federalism is the result o f historical developm ent as much as M adisonian
planning, M adison did entrench federalism into our national system. Federalism

allow s citizens to be close to local governm ents and thus allow s for ‘citizen
effectiveness,’ while, at the same time, citizens are distant from the large national
governm ent w hich m aintains its 'system capacity.’ M adison also suggested that by
“enlarging the sphere” o f governm ent via the republican principle, representatives
w ould remain responsive to the people, while, at the sam e tim e, Senators w ould be
elected from a larger geographic area and thus m aintain som e autonom y.
Again, the issue eventually revolves around the concept o f ‘intensity.’ Both
Dahl and M adison understand that intense m inorities dem and action and in some
cases deserve responsiveness. H owever, they also w ere aw are o f the fact there is no
relationship betw een the size o f a group or faction and the likelihood that the goals o f
the group will be in the “general interests” o f the country.

CHAPTER 4
“D iscrim inating Betw een Econom ic and Political R ights'’
B oth R obert Dahl and Jam es M adison w ere concerned with the issue o f rights.
They w anted to create political system s that w ere dem ocratic, but at the sam e time,
they w anted to create system s that w ould protect individual rights, group rights, rights
o f the m ajority and rights o f the m inority. H ow ever, for both theorists the term
“rights” is only vaguely defined. This is a short-com ing o f their political theories. In
order to com pletely understand how dem ocratic institutions protect, or fail to protect,
rights, one m ust have a clearer definition of “rights” than the definition provided by
either D ahl or M adison.
P ut in its m ost sim plistic term s, all rights, either allocated or enforced by
governm ents, can be sub-divided into political rights and econom ic rights. Rights
m ust exhibit certain criteria in order to fall into either category. This is not to say that
all rights w ill fall neatly into one o f those tw o categories. It m ay be m ore helpful to
assum e a spectrum ranging from purely political rights to purely econom ic rights. It
is entirely possible that m any rights w ould exhibit criteria o f both categories.
H ow ever, this does not preclude us from determ ining if a right is “m ore political”
than econom ic, or vice versa.
The im portant question, at this point, is w hat criteria will be used to determ ine
if a right is political or econom ic? In order to answ er this question I propose to use an
econom ic theory. In the late 1950s and early 1960s econom ists developed a field o f
thought know n as collective action th eo ry .1 C ollective action theory divided

1 M ancur O lson. The Logic o f Collective A ction (New York: O xford
U niversity Press, 1970), 99.
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econom ic goods into tw o categories. The theory held that goods are either “public
goods” or “private goods.” However, as was noted above, ju st as the dichotom y
between political rights and econom ic rights is not absolute, econom ists also noted
that goods w ould fall into a spectrum ranging from purely public to purely private.
Econom ists developed certain criteria to determ ine if a good was public or private.

I

plan to use the sam e criteria econom ists use for econom ic goods, but superim posed
upon “political goods.” Therefore, it w ill be argued that “political rights” exhibit the
same criteria as public goods and “econom ic rights” exhibit the same criteria as
private goods. W hat those exact criteria are will be developed in a subsequent section
o f this thesis.
The next logical question, at this point, is, w hat purpose is served by sub
dividing rights into tw o categories? R eturning to collective action theory, econom ists
noted that individuals react differently to incentive structures created by public goods
than to incentive structures created by private goods. They noted that people have an
incentive to pay for private goods, but that they have a disincentive to pay fo r public
goods. Thus, by sub-dividing goods into two categories, econom ists are better able to
understand how the econom ic m arketplace functioned.
W hat if the sam e logic could be applied to the “politica l m arketplace” ? If it
could be dem onstrated that people react differently tow ards governm ent “allocated”
econom ic rights as opposed to political rights, such an understanding m ight help
explain the dem ocratic process. In other w ords, it m ight be possible to argue that
econom ic rights elicit from individuals different incentive structures than do political
rights. It w ill be argued that political rights, like public goods, create a disincentive to
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participate in the political system . Just as public goods create a disincentive to pay,
political rights create a disincentive to participate. In contrast, econom ic rights, like
private goods, create a strong incentive to participate.
By using collective action theory to provide further insight into how people
react in a political system w ith respect to the allocation of econom ic and political
rights, one m ight be able to unlock one o f the m ost puzzling aspects o f dem ocratic
theory. B oth M adison and D ahl w ere concerned about how intensity of interest or
intensity o f participation w ould affect the dem ocratic process. M adison never tried to
quantify intensity. He did, how ever, understand its effects on dem ocratic systems.
He relied on federalism to m ake system s responsive to intensity, but also hopefully,
to prevent the adverse effects intensity m ight cause. D ahl w anted to develop a system
to em pirically m easure intensity. However, in the end, he concluded that it was too
abstract a concept to m easure.2 He w as forced to adm it that polyarchy would only
w ork if intense conflicts w ere avoided, or, barring that possibility, he advocated a
variety o f coporatist and consociational dem ocratic structures to deal with the
problem o f intensity. H ow ever, if the use o f collective action theory can provide an
insight into the causes o f intensity, dem ocratic theorists m ight better be able to
account for intensity.
It is also im portant to clarify any value-laden judgem ents about intensity.
M adison and D ahl did not view all “ intense efforts” as detrim ental to the political
process. It is very possible for an intense effort to be positive. H ow ever, they were
aware that intensity needed to be understood if dem ocracy was to be understood as a

2 R obert D ahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 101.
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real process, not a hypothetical process. Furtherm ore, in certain circum stances and
with certain issues, both theorists understood that intensity could be hazardous to the
political process. Dahl felt intense m inorities could tyrannize apathetic m ajorities or
other m inorities, while M adison felt intense m inorities needed constitutional and
structural protections.

C O L L E C T IV E A C T IO N TH EO R Y

The m ost im portant criteria that separates political rights from econom ic
rights is rivalry. Political rights have the characteristic o f non-rivalry while econom ic
rights have a strong tendency tow ards rivalry. This occurs because political rights are
typically granted or enforced on an infinite level; i.e., there is an unlim ited supply o f
m ost political rights. On the contrary, econom ic rights m ust be rationed because they
are a finite resource. In order to better understand this concept, a m ore com prehensive
understanding o f collective action theory is needed. Specifically, one needs to
understand the criteria econom ists used to separate public goods from private goods.
This is necessary because the sam e criteria will be used to differentiate between
political rights and econom ic rights. The criteria used to differentiate public goods
from private goods revolves around three concepts. The concepts are non-rivalry,
non-excludability and non-divisibility.
N on-rivalry describes how collective goods or public goods do not inspire
com petition. The reason is, in a hypothetical sense, a public good has an infinite
supply. Econom ists argue that com petition for resources occurs because all resources
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are finite. Therefore, both the farm er and the rancher com pete for land because they
both need the land and it is finite in supply. H ow ever, public goods, to som e degree,
offer an infinite supply o f a good and therefore, there is no need for com petition.
A good exam ple o f a purely public good is a lighthouse. The lighthouse
produces light and light is considered a non-rivalry good. Sim ply put, a captain
aboard a ship can look at the light from the lighthouse for as long as he wants. His
actions w ill do nothing to decrease the am ount o f light available to other captains. In
other w ords, the light can not be “used up.” In a m ore technical sense, M ancur Olson
w rites, “jointness o f supply [non-rivalry] accounts for the fact that additional
m em bers can enjoy a good w ith little or no reduction in the consum ption o f the old
m em bers.”3
O ne m ight note that O lson did not speak in absolutes. F or instance, a road is
also considered a public good. In an ideal w orld, roads w ould exhibit the
characteristic o f non-rivalry. O f course roads do not get “used up” when som eone
drives on it. There is still ju st as m uch road left for the next person. H owever, roads
are not purely public as the use o f the road by one person can decrease the use o f the
road by another person. A nyone w ho has been involved in a traffic jam know s this is
true. H owever, in a general sense, the publics use o f public goods does create a zerosum situation. By definition, the benefits o f a public good increases as the num ber of
people w ho seek to use the public good increases.4 Or, put another way, if one person

3

M ancur Olson, The Logic o f Collective Action, 14.

4

Ibid., 28.
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uses a road, then one “unit”5o f the road is provided. If tw o people use the road, then
tw o “units” o f equal am ount are provided. H ow ever, if two people seek to use the
sam e acre o f land, then sm aller “units” m ust be provided to account for the rivalry for
the good.
The second criteria for a public good is non-excludability.

N on-excludability

is the condition that once a public good is created, regardless o f the m eans, no one
can be prevented from using the public good. This characteristic m akes public goods
very different from private goods. W ith a private good, the ow ner o f the good can
ration access to the good. A collective or public good is here defined as any good
such that, if any person in a group o f persons consum es it, it cannot feasibly be
w ithheld from others in that group. In other w ords, those w ho do not purchase or pay
for any o f the public good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the
consum ption o f the good, as in the case o f non-collective goods. This characteristic
o f public goods is significant in affecting the incentive structure people face when
trying to produce or allocate collective goods.
G arrett Hardin, in his fam ous “The T ragedy o f the C om m ons,” discussed such
an incentive structure. He noted that any tim e a com m unity had a com m on area in
w hich to graze livestock, that com m on area was eventually destroyed by overuse. He
observed that people w ould m uch rather use the public com m ons than their own land.
Since the lot was public, and therefore non-excludible, anyone could use the land at

5 “U nit” in this case is an am biguous term at best. It refers to the fact that an
individual, by using the road, has realized som e utility by doing so. H ow ever, it is
difficult for econom ists to develop concrete m easurem ents for public goods because
they are indivisible.
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no apparent cost to him self. In essence, there w as an incentive structure to use the
land at a rate far higher than if one was required to pay for the use o f the land.
R eturning to the lighthouse exam ple, one can note the realistic applications o f
non-excludability. A ssum e that the lighthouse tried to ration the use o f its product by
selling perm its to use the light. This w ould be ineffective because o f the non
excludability characteristic o f the good. How could the lighthouse prevent the use of
its good by non-paying individuals? There is no w ay to direct the light to only those
ships that have a perm it. Furtherm ore, the ow ners o f the lighthouse cannot require
non-paying m em bers to w ear blinders.
H ow ever, like non-rivalry, the characteristic of non-excludability is not
absolute. H arvey Rosen notes that a lighthouse could be m ade excludible if the right
technology w ere m ade available.6 He argues that in m odem tim es lighthouses tend to
be electronic and therefore signals could be scram bled for non-payers. Or, in a m ore
extrem e case, he notes that the lighthouse could be given perm ission to fire m issiles
at ships using but not buying a perm it. He also points out that public goods do not
have to have both characteristics m entioned above. He cites roads as an exam ple. A
road m ay be purely non-excludible, but not necessarily purely non-rival.
The last characteristic o f a public good is non-divisibility. N on-divisibility is
the characteristic that public goods are allocated in lum p sums o f all o r nothing.
There is no w ay to allocate different percentages o f public goods to different citizens.
The Italian econom ist Ugo M azzola em phasized w hat he called the “indivisibility o f

6 H arvey Rosen. Public Finance (Illinois: Irwin, 1988), 64.
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public goods.”7 H e noted that once a good was created it w ent to all people equally.
That is not to say that it benefited all people equally. For instance, the entire
com m unity m ay pay for a fire departm ent, but it m ay benefit the person living in the
log house m uch m ore than the person living in the glass house.
R eturning once m ore to the lighthouse, it is obvious that ships cannot be
allocated different am ounts o f light. Either the lighthouse is on or off. It is not
possible to grant one ship a 40% allocation o f light and another ship only 20% o f the
light. Everyone gets 100% o f the light or none o f the light.
Before explaining how public goods have sim ilar characteristics to our
hypothetical “political goods,” it w ould be helpful to briefly describe private goods.
Private goods differ form public goods in that they have none o f the characteristics
listed above. A private good will have som e, if not all, o f the characteristics o f
rivalry, excludibility and divisibility. For instance, an autom obile can be a private
good. If a person ow ns a car, he or she can exclude anyone else from using it. A
better exam ple w ould be land. Land, in the hands o f private ow nership, exhibits all
the characteristics o f private goods. Like the car, the use o f private property, or
access to it, m ay be denied. Second, land is obviously a finite resource. Therefore, it
is a good that exhibits the characteristic o f rivalry. Every acre o f land a farm er uses is
one acre o f land a rancher or hom ebuilder cannot use. A nd last, land is divisible.
Land can be apportioned in varying am ounts to different people.

7 M ancur O lson, The Logic o f C ollective Action, 99-100.

72

W hat separates private goods from public goods is the zero-sum gain
m entality that surrounds private goods.8 W hen a private resource is allocated to a
specific individual, all other individuals can interpret that allocation as a loss. In fact,
Lester Thurow , a noted Y ale econom ist, refers to the allocation o f econom ic
resources as “loss allocation.” He is suggesting that anytim e the governm ent, or any
association allocates a resource that is private in nature, it is also allocating a loss to
all other segm ents o f society. This characteristic is going to be im portant later in the
discussion o f the hypothetical “econom ic rights.” It will be argued that “econom ic
rights” exhibit a zero-sum gain characteristic w hile “political rights” do not.
One last definition is required before one can fully understand collective
action theory. The concept o f the “free rider” is im portant in understanding the
com plexities o f allocating public goods, and therefore “political goods”. A free rider
is som eone w ho chooses not to contribute to the cost o f producing a public good
because he or she know s that the good will be non-excludable. W e can again look to
the lighthouse for an explanation. Econom ists argue that if contributions to raise
m oney for building a lighthouse were voluntary, not enough m oney w ould be
collected. This w ould lead to w hat econom ist refer to as an inefficient am ount o f a
public good.9 T he reason for this under allocation is that individuals know that they
will be allow ed to use the lighthouse even if they did not help pay for it. Thus the
incentive structure becom es, “let other people pay for it and I will use it.” It is
im portant to note that, in general, public goods suffer from a free rider problem but
private goods do not.

8 Lester Thurow . The Zero-Sum Society (London: Penguin Books, 1980), 11.
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The concept o f the free rider is im portant to this thesis for two reasons. First,
it will later be argued that “political rights’’ suffer from free riders ju st like public
goods suffer from free riders.

And, like private goods, “econom ic rights” do not.

Second, it allow s us to draw a distinction betw een the econom ic m arketplace and the
political m arketplace. G overnm ents and econom ist have developed a w ay to avoid
the free rider problem in the econom ic m arketplace. They use m andatory taxation to
require everyone to contribute to the construction o f public goods. This w ay the
burden o f national defense, police and fire protection are bom by all taxpayers.
H ow ever, the political m arketplace has no institution to require participation.
Therefore, it will be argued that “political rights” not only have a free rider problem ,
but that it is im possible to avoid the free rider problem .
The purpose o f superim posing collective action theory, an econom ic m odel,
onto a political system is to determ ine if the “rules” o f the econom ic w orld apply to
the political world. Thus, I have introduced the term s econom ic m arketplace and
“political m arketplace.” In order to draw an effective com parison, a m ore developed
definition o f “political m arketplace” is needed.
Joseph Schum peter, in his epic w ork Capitalism , Socialism and D em ocracy,
introduced the idea that political system s functioned sim ilarly to econom ic system s.10
Schum peter com pared the political com petition for votes to com petitions w ithin the
market. Voters acted like consum ers in that they choose between policies. The
policies are analogous to products offered in the marketplace. These products

9 H arvey Rosen, Public Finance, 72.
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(policies) w ere offered by “political entrepreneurs.” " In other w ords, politicians act
like producers and voters act like consum ers. Thus, political parties and associations
regulated the political m arketplace in the same way firms and consum ers regulated
the econom ic m arketplace. S chum peter argues that it is not cynical to abide by the
philosophy that “W hat businessm en do not understand is that exactly as they are
dealing in oil so I am dealing in votes.” 12 Put another way, politicians buy and sell
votes as currency in the sam e w ay the businessm en buy and sell oil as currency.
Schum peter is not alone in this view. A nthony D owns, in his book An
Econom ic Theory o f D em ocracy, suggests that political parties are ju st like firms in a
m arketplace. They seek to m axim ize votes ju st as a firm w ould try to m axim ize
m arket share or profits. These m odels are significant in that they offer some
understanding as to w hy dem ands for “econom ic rights” are so intense. Schum peter
argues individuals seek to satisfy short-run desires in the econom ic market.
Sim ilarly, politicians and voters seek to do the sam e thing in the political
m arketplace.13
All o f the above concepts bring us to the heart o f this thesis. As m entioned at
the beginning o f this chapter, it will be argued that there exist tw o types o f rights.
They are econom ic rights and political rights.'4 It will be further argued that these

10 Joseph Schum peter. Capitalism, Socialism and D em ocracy ( New York:
H arper Torch Books, 1941), 269.
11 Ibid., 291.
12 Ibid., 292.
13 Ibid., 29 5.
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rights can be defined by using the criteria econom ists use to define public and private
goods. The next logical step is to argue that if political rights are like public goods,
then they must suffer from a free-rider problem . Thus, one could offer the hypothesis
that either political goods attract a less intense level o f political participation, or that
econom ic rights attract a higher level o f political participation.
In order to exam ine w hether political rights act like public goods, it will be
necessary to investigate if political goods exhibit the characteristics o f non-rivalry,
non-excludability and non-divisibility. The political right to free speech is as close to
a purely political good as the lighthouse is to a purely public good. Therefore, the
political rights of free speech will be useful to test the hypothesis.
Free speech definitely has characteristics o f non-rivalry. It is difficult to argue
that one persons use o f speech “uses u p'' the speech, so that there is less speech left
for the next person. In essence, the am ount o f speech is not finite. Or, speech is
rarely subject to a zero-sum gain mentality. Just as it was argued that captains
looking at the light from the lighthouse do not decrease the am ount o f light left for the
next ship, people speaking in public, in new spapers or on television do not leave less
speech available for the next person.
There are, o f course, no absolutes. On a theoretical level speech is com pletely
non-rivalry. On a practical level, there are possibilities for rivalry. Just as a road can
be non-rivalry in theory but exhibit some level o f rivalry during a traffic jam , speech
too can diverge from the ideal. Television has a lim ited num ber o f hours.
N ew spapers have a lim ited am ount o f space. C onventions can only allow so many

14 From this point on quotations will not be used for either term . It is
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people to speak. H ow ever, it would not be unfair to suggest that speech exhibits
strong tendencies tow ards non-rivalry.
Can som eone be excluded from free speech? It is possible, but unlikely.
Once a right like free speech is granted, it is usually granted to everyone. The First
A m endm ent m ade no attem pt to delegate free speech rights based on gender,
ethnicity, or religion. In fact, the 14th A m endm ent alm ost ensures that political rights
will be non-excludable via its “equal protection” clause. Once political rights are
granted, the Suprem e C ourt typically puts a heavy burden on any argum ent seeking to
exclude a group from protection.1"
There are, o f course, exceptions. The H atch Act excludes governm ent
em ployees from certain types o f speech. Provisions for the lim itation o f foreign
lobbyists could be view ed as a case o f excludability. H ow ever, these exam ples
represent small groups and are justified (in the courts) as necessary to the greater
good. A gain, like the lighthouse, once a public good or political right exists, or is
enforced, it is very difficult to exclude anyone from using the good or right.
And finally, are political rights non-divisible? Free speech appears to support
such an assertion. Is it possible to grant shares o f free speech? D o certain people get
more free speech than others? Like econom ic public goods, political rights are
typically allocated in lum p sums. An individual either gets all or nothing. R ationing
becom es extrem ely im practical. Just as the lighthouse could not give m ore light to

assum ed that these are hypothetical definitions.
15 Robert B ork, “The C onstitution, O riginal Intent and Econom ic R ights,”
(San D iego Law R eview 23, No. 4, 1986), 823.
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one ship over another, political system s have a difficult tim e granting m ore speech to
one person than another.
The flip side o f this inquiry asks w hether private goods are like econom ic
rights. Or, do econom ic rights exhibit the characteristics o f rivalry, excludability and
divisibility. To test this hypothesis, I will use a governm ent grant as an exam ple o f an
econom ic right.
G overnm ent grants suffer the characteristic o f rivalry. Rivalry is typically
determ ined by w hether o r not the good or right in question has an infinite or finite
supply. W hereas speech m ay be infinite, governm ent resources (m oney) are not. The
lim ited am ount o f dollars available for grants creates an econom ic zero-sum gain, i.e.,
for every dollar allocated to research grants, one less dollar is available for other
groups seeking funding from the governm ent. Every dollar spent on education is a
dollar that can not be spent on subsidies. At times, C ongress has attem pted to avoid
the lim itations o f rivalry by deficit spending. In the end, the national debt and the
interest on debt, sim ply delayed loss allocation.
Grants are also excludable. W hen a grant is offered to an AIDS researcher at
the U niversity o f M ichigan, there is nothing that requires the governm ent to offer the
same grant to any other researcher. In fact, rivalry for finite funds makes
excludability absolutely necessary. Excludability is required to deal w ith the fact that
finite resources dem and political system s to make choices betw een Person A or
Person B or G roup A over G roup B.
Grants are divisible. W ith the lighthouse, light could not be rationed out in
any m anner other than 100% o r nothing. W ith an econom ic right, every individual or
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group can be vested with a different am ount o f the right. W hile thousands o f grants
are offered every year, none are for the same am ount.
If it can be accepted that political rights, in general, have the same
characteristics as public goods, and econom ic rights, in general, have the same
characteristics as private goods, then one can m ake generalized assum ptions about
how people w ill react to the allocation o f each. Econom ists have determ ined that
individuals react differently to the allocation o f private and public goods. Therefore,
it is possible that people react differently to the “allocation” o f political and econom ic
rights. If this is true, then it m ay offer some insight as to w hy people react with
differing intensities to different political issues.16

16 The term political in this instance does not refer to the sam e use o f political
in the term “political rights.” In this instance, political refers to the political process.

CHAPTER 5
“The Intensity o f Interests”
The first chapter o f this thesis provided a general overview o f D ahl’s notions
o f dem ocracy as contained w ithin M adison’s constitutional framework. The second
chapter suggested the possibility that rights could be divided into two groups based
on criteria established by econom ists to differentiate betw een public and private
goods. That is, C hapter Tw o sim ply offered definitions o f political and econom ic
rights. H ow ever, one m ust explain why creating such a dichotom y is useful for
understanding dem ocratic theory. This chapter will m ake the assertion that econom ic
rights attract a higher level o f intensity than do political rights, and it will offer
possible reasons w hy econom ic rights attract a m ore intense level o f participation.
First, it is necessary to have a com plete understanding o f what Dahl m eant by
intensity o f participation and w hy he felt it was im portant to understand intensity in
relation to the dem ocratic process. In A Preface to D em ocratic Theory Dahl asked,
“W hat if the m inority prefers its alternative m uch m ore passionately than the m ajority
prefers a contrary alternative? D oes the m ajority principle still make sense?” This is
the fundam ental problem that intensity presents to the dem ocratic process. He
continues w ith the assertion that,
Intensity is alm ost a m odem psychological version o f natural rights. For
ju st as M adison believed that governm ent should be constructed so as to
prevent m ajorities from invading the natural rights o f m inorities, so a
m odem M adison m ight argue that governm ent should be designed to
inhibit a relatively apathetic m ajority from cram m ing its policy dow n the
throats o f a relatively intense m inority.1
Clearly, this is a norm ative argum ent. It could ju st as easily be argued that no m atter
how intense a m inority m ight feel about an issue, they are still a m inority. D ah l’s
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argum ent could be turned around to suggest that any tim e an intense m inority rules
over a m ajority, no m atter how apathetic that m ajority m ay be, that there has been a
breakdow n in the dem ocratic process.
Dahl argues that intensity, in general, is extrem ely difficult to m easure
em pirically, but it is an observable characteristic none the less. B ecause there are no
precise ways o f m easuring severity or intensity o f conflict, and it is therefore difficult
to com pare the intensity o f one conflict with another, it is difficult to explain how that
intensity plays a role in deciding the outcom e o f the dem ocratic process.2 However,
D ahl counters,
If one is prepared to accept as indices threats or m oves to disrupt the
constitutional system , threatened or actual violence against or on
behalf o f national policies, or expressions by sober and inform ed
observers or participants that a given conflict w ill lead to disruption
revolution, or civil war, then the weight o f the historical evidence seems
to offer solid support to the contrary.3
Dahl notes that historically, A m erica has faced about one “intense conflict” per
generation. He m akes no m ention as to w hether the intense conflict is an “intense
m inority” or an “intense m ajority.” His point is that “intensity,” in general, is a
destabilizing force in polyarchy. He cites such exam ples as the A lien and Sedition
Acts, the H artford C onvention, the C ivil W ar and the Election o f 1876. Dahl rarely
identifies intense groups as being either an “intense m inority” or an “intense
m ajority.” Dahl argues that m ajorities rarely form. H e believes that m ultiple

1 Robert Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 90.
2 Ibid., 102.
3 R obert Dahl, D em ocracy, Liberty and Equality, 170.

m inorities unite tem porarily to m otivate political action.4 H owever, the prim ary
focus o f this thesis is to identify the role intense m inority groups play in the political
process and identify the causes o f such groups. Dahl is probably correct when he
asserts that intense m ajorities will alw ays achieve their goals regardless o f
constitutional or institutional checks.
It is im portant for Dahl to understand the nature o f intensity in his pluralist
m odel. A ccording to D ahl, pluralism functions on a relationship betw een autonom y
and control.'^ Individual factions need to be autonom ous enough to assert preferences
and freely threaten leaders w ith rem oval if their dem ands are not met. However,
factions also need to be controlled enough to prevent them from doing harm to the
public good.6 In a pluralist society, the state is not the only institution that can control
or lim it the autonom y o f factions. O ther factions can also serve this function.
Therefore, the intensity in w hich factions participate in a pluralist society becom es
im portant in predicting political outcom es. Dahl attem pts to ascribe m easurable
characteristics to factions in order to m easure their intensity. H ow ever, he is not
satisfied w ith the results. He confesses, “Alas, satisfactory m easures for describing
am ounts o f influence, control, pow er, and so on are much m ore elusive than
quantitative m easures for describing w ealth and incom e.”7

4 It should be noted that such a philosophy again show s the sim ilarity Dahl has
w ith M adisonian thought. M adison also believed the m ajorities w ould be tem porary
and the collection o f several m inority factions.
5 Robert Dahl, D ilem m as o f Pluralist D emocracy, 16.
6 Ibid., 17.
7 Robert Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 78.
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For D ahl, too m uch intensity could dism antle his polyarchal form a
governm ent. A consensus o f norms and a lack o f extrem e cleavages is a prerequisite
for polyarchy to form. H owever, as intense conflicts arise stable polyarchy becom es
less likely.8 Furtherm ore, D ahl asserts that intensity o f interest detracts citizens from
pursuing the “politics o f v irtu e /’ In other words, intensity o f interest is detrim ental to
the ancient G reek concept o f the public good.9
D ah l’s concern over intensity leads him to advocate form s o f consociational
d em ocracy .10 This presents difficulties for anyone studying D ah l’s view s with
respect to dem ocratic theory. He appears to be a strong advocate o f a “purer” form o f
dem ocracy and is typically an advocate o f m ajoritarian ru le .11 H ow ever, the
consociational m odel, or w hat Dahl term s the “consensus m odel” o f dem ocracy
provides “m inority vetoes” to alm ost every relevant group in society. It is ironic that
D ahl’s m ain criticism o f federalism is that it provides too m any sub-system s (states)
w ith m inority veto power. This contradiction, if nothing else, provides insight into
D ahl’s concern w ith the role o f intensity in the dem ocratic process. It also shows that
intensity is a concept that he never com pletely integrated into his holistic dem ocratic
theory. In fact, m ost o f his later w ritings com pletely ignore the role o f intensity.
This may be a tacit adm ission that it is a concept that he is unable to deal with.

8 R obert Dahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 135.
9 See next section titled “N orm ative Q uestions.” It is argued that intensity
should be view ed as a value neutral term . In certain cases, intensity could be used to
prom ote the “politics o f virtue.”
10 D ahl exhibited interest in this form of governm ent as early as his doctoral
dissertation.

In fact, Dahl notes that the problem o f intensity o f m inority groups has led
m ost polyarchies to adopt som e form o f governm ent other than a strictly majoritarian
i •*>

system. ~ He cites A rend L ijphart’s study o f tw enty-six stable polyarchies. O f the
tw enty-six countries studied, only six are classified as purely m ajoritarian.

1^

All

others have either a “m ajoritarian-federal,” “consensual-unitary” or a “consensual”
system o f dem ocracy.

Dahl argues that there are only three types o f system s in

w hich intensity is not a problem . They are (1) nations that have extrem ely
hom ogeneous populations, (2) nations w here the m inority parties never feel their
fundam ental rights are endangered and (3) nations w here the m inority feels there is a
strong possibility that they could becom e the m ajority in the fu tu re.14
In D ahl’s later w orks, he began to m ove aw ay from the argum ent that
intensity o f m inority groups was the prim ary hindrance to a m ajoritarian sy stem .'5
He began to turn to unequal resources as the m ost significant barrier to creating a
m ore dem ocratic, and in m any w ays, a more m ajoritarian system .

H ow ever, the two

interpretations are not fundam entally different. In his early w ork, he suggested that
intensity obscured true pow er relationships in a pluralist society. In his later work, he

11 Ibid., 160.
1^

“ Dahl identifies several types o f intense groups. The different types o f
intense groups w ill be discussed in length in C hapter 6.
13 Ibid., 160.
14 Ibid., 161.
15 W hen Dahl discusses intense groups, he typically is referring to m inority
groups. He contends that m ajorities seldom form. W hen they do form , they are an
am algam ation o f several m inorities. H ow ever, this thesis is prim arily concerned with
the ability o f small groups (m inorities) with high levels o f intensity to tyrannize over
the m ajority.

argues that unequal financial resources obscures “fair" pow er rela tio n sh ip s.16 It is
not difficult to see that the approach to his argum ent has changed tracks, but the
destination rem ains the same. The results are the same, w hether factions gain
inordinent am ounts o f influence via intensity or wealth. The issue eventually evolves
into one o f pow er. If one replaces the concepts o f intensity or w ealth with power,
D ahl’s argum ent in the first chapters o f A Preface to Econom ic D em ocracy appears to
suggest m ore consistency on his part. “W e m ust strive to reduce the adverse effects
on dem ocracy and political equality that result w hen econom ic liberty produces great
inequality in the distribution o f resources and thus, directly and indirectly, o f
pow er.” 17
A lthough it is not expressly stated in any o f D ah l’s work, there is an obvious
im pression that he views intensity as a negative. He views it as a distortion to the
dem ocratic process. Intensity is som ething that m ust be accounted for by creating
institutions or processes that m ove political system s aw ay from m ajoritarian rule. His
attitude m ost likely stem s from tw o beliefs. First, Dahl views polyarchy as a step in
the direction o f a m ore pure form o f dem ocracy. Therefore, anything that disturbs
this evolutionary process w ould probably be view ed as a negative. Second, Dahl
adam antly feels that m inorities tyrannize over m ajorities much m ore often than the
other w ay around. This returns one to the fundam ental difference between Dahl and
M adison. M adison w anted to protect m inorities from tyrannous m ajorities. Dahl
views the problem in exactly opposite terms. He w ants to protect m ajorities from

16 This is obviously a norm ative assertion that will be dealt with in subsequent
sections.
17 R obert D ahl, A Preface to Econom ic D em ocracy, 51.
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intense, tyrannous m inorities. This contradiction requires one to look at intensity
with as little bias as possible and attem pt to ascertain when intense m inorities could
be view ed as a positive aspect o f dem ocracy and when they could be view ed as
detrim ental.

NORMATIVE QUESTIONS
All norm ative issues about intensity revolve around tw o questions. W hen is
an intense m inority a danger to m ajority rule or the rights o f the populace? In other
words, there are tim es w hen a m inority can abuse its veto pow er by preventing
legislation deem ed im portant by the m ajority. And, when does an intense m inority
act as protector o f justice? There are also tim es w hen intense m inorities advocate
issues w hich are “m orally right” against the will o f the m ajority. For instance,
speaking from a value-laden perspective, the small m inority o f Senators who
prevented and delayed the Civil R ights Act o f the 1960s could be view ed as a
negative intense m inority. Conversely, and also speaking from a value laden
perspective, the sm all intense m inority that advocated the abolitionist m ovem ent o f
the 1850s could be viewed as a positive intense minority.
A lthough Dahl tends to view intense m inorities from a negative perspective,
he is aw are o f w hat he calls “theoretical problem s.” 18 “To begin w ith,” he writes,
in order to ju d g e when a m ajority m isuses its pow ers by
w ronging its adversaries, obviously we need some criteria. W hat
should these criteria be? Are we to say then, that w henever the
interests o f the m inority are opposed to those o f the m ajority, a

18 Ibid., 14.
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m ajority necessarily m isuses its pow er sim ply because it acts to
secure its ow n interests?19
O f course, the same argum ents could be m ade substituting “the m ajority'’ for "the
m inority.” In order to answ er his own question, Dahl seeks to set up criteria by which
to distinguish injustice from straightforw ard use o f power. He argues that if tyranny
is defined too narrow ly, i.e., any action that is detrim ental to anyone’s interests, then
all action by a m ajority or m inority could be interpreted as tyranny. This does set up
a tension betw een w hat is unjust and w hat is tyrannous. O m itting, for one m om ent,
the value questions around the term ‘u n ju st,’ Dahl argues that if em ployers are
guaranteed the right to hire child labor, there is an injustice present. H ow ever, if the
governm ent forbids the use o f child labor, then the em ployers m ight view that move
as tyrannical.
C onversely, if the m ajority is able to determ ine what is “ju s t” w ithout limits to
this power, then one runs the risk o f asserting that the dem ocratic process can never
be unjust. Thus, if we cannot devise criteria for m ajority tyranny, then it becom es
difficult to ascribe m eaning to any study trying to understand the role o f intense
m inorities in the dem ocratic process. As a result, Dahl engages in a tortured attempt
to define w hich rights are inalienable and w hich are not.20 He ends up concluding
that dem ocracy itself is a fundam ental right superior to other rights, m ainly property
rights. Dahl, in essence, is creating a hierarchy o f rights. This hierarchy places an
individual’s right to dem ocratically control all associations, including econom ic
associations, superior to an individual’s right to private property. H e does this in

19 Ibid., 14.
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order to reconcile his desire to justify popular control of econom ic firms, but at the
sam e tim e, not appear to be justifying the violation o f a “ fundam ental right.” If the
“fundam ental rig h t” to property is inferior to the “fundam ental right” to m ajority rule,
then Dahl can have it both ways.
Dahl is also concerned about the effects o f intensity on political integration
and the public pursuit o f “civic virtue.” D ahl sees intensity as a hindrance to creating
political consensus. He argues that w ith the rise o f corporate capitalism , political
fragm entation has increased. Every interest group has the ability, and often the
resources, to prom ote its own econom ic agenda. H ow ever, as intensity o f dem and
increases, the possibility for political integration decreases. Dahl notes that over the
past few decades, political participation by interest groups has becom e m ore intense.
He cites as causes the ability for interest groups to use direct m ailings, easier access
to m oney and the rise o f single-issue interest groups. He concludes that if this
phenom enon is not checked in som e general way, dem ocracies will see an increasing
am ount o f delegation o f responsibilities by legislatures to independent, unelected
associations.21 The other possibility is that dem ocracies will see an increasing
num ber o f issues decided by referendum . If this becam e the case, it could be argued
that society is becom ing m ore dem ocratic as a result o f intense dem ands by m inority
interest groups.22

20 Ibid., 53-56.
'yj

R obert Dahl, D ilem m as o f Pluralist Dem ocracy, 80.

It is interesting to note that Dahl, a preem inent dem ocratic theorist
contributes alm ost no scholarship to the effects o f the initiative process in dem ocratic
theory.
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Frances Piven and R ichard Clow ard argue that political participation, with
respect to econom ic issues, has increased in intensity. In their study o f the American
electorate they noted that the increasing com plexities o f the A m erican econom y
encouraged business leaders to create a political infrastructure capable o f conducting
national election cam paigns.23 They also record that the am ount o f interest group
activity began to rise in response to increasing econom ic regulation by the
governm ent. They conclude that such intense lobbying has created election victories
for candidates who do not have the m ajority support o f the electorate.24
Dahl also notes a paradox created by increasing intensity o f participation. He
argues that large-scale dem ocracies need active pluralism to survive. He understands
that pluralism requires a variety o f interest groups to pursue their own agenda on the
basis o f self and group interest. H ow ever, he also notes that fragm entation leads to a
decrease in civic virtue.25 As people becom e m ore self-interested, they conversely
becom e less interested in civic virtue. In fact, som e C ongressm en have noted that
Congress itself has begun to view certain associations, i.e. farm associations with
respect to subsidy policies, as the only relevant body o f people they need to consider
w ith respect to certain issues.26 In some cases, the civic virtue of the group has
becom es m ore im portant than the civic virtue o f the entire populace.

"3 Pivin and C low ard, Why A m ericans D o n 't Vote, 10.
24 Ibid., 11.
25 R obert D ahl, “The Ills o f the System ”, 447.
26 Pat W illiam s, interview ed by the author, M issoula, M T., 26 N ovem ber
1998.

O ther theorists, besides Dahl, have noted that small groups tend to have a
higher level o f intensity, and thus have the ability to prom ote their agenda to a higher
degree than their num bers w arrant.27 In other w ords, w hat small groups could never
achieve through a sim ple m ajority rule procedure, they can accom plish through
small, intense, group lobbying efforts.

Both V.O. Key and David Trum an appear to

support D ah l’s contention that polyarchies are dom inated by several intense
m inorities rather than an apathetic m ajority. M ancur Olson notes that pluralism is
based on the concept that as one interest group m akes outrageous dem ands on society,
other interest groups will m obilize to counterbalance those dem ands, thus prom oting
a “reasonably ju st and satisfactory” outcom e. H ow ever, he contends this is not an
accurate description o f pluralism . “Since relatively small groups will be able
voluntarily to organize and act in support o f their com m on interests,” he argues, “and
since large groups norm ally will not be able to do so, the outcom e o f the political
struggle am ong the various groups in society will not be sym m etrical.28
He concludes that politicians have long understood that small groups with
vested interests have disproportionate am ounts o f pow er. A gain, the value
im plications here cannot be avoided. The use o f the term “disproportionate am ount
o f pow er” im plies an “unfair” am ount o f pow er. M ost o f the exam ples O lson and
Key use to illustrate their position highlight negative results from intense m inority
efforts. This thesis does not attem pt to distinguish betw een “good” and “bad”

-)7
' O ther theorists (O lson included) note that sm all groups achieve their
political goals m ore often, not because o f intensity reasons, but because they have a
m ore focused agenda to pursue.
' 8 M ancur O lson, The Logic o f Collective Action, 127.
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intensity. It sim ply attem pts to offer an explanation as to how groups acquire
differing levels o f intensity. This is the subject we w ill turn to next.

ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND INCREASED LEVELS OF INTENSITY

In the final chapter o f this thesis, I will engage D ahl in a “conversation” about
how he w ould react to my contention, first, that all rights can be placed on a spectrum
ranging betw een purely econom ic rights to purely political rights. O nce again, the
criteria used to determ ine w hich end o f the spectrum a “right” w ould lean towards
w as adopted from econom ic collective action theory. Secondly, econom ic rights
attract a higher level o f intensity and participation than political rights. The reasons
are: (1) econom ic rights exhibit a zero-sum gain nature w ith regards to their
allocation (2) political rights exhibit a free-rider problem and thus attract less
intensity (3) econom ic rights create a higher level o f incentive because they have a
tendency to provide m ore opportunities for personal gain, and (4) econom ic issues
tend to revolve around m inority groups and the sm aller the group the greater ability
to m obilize in a pluralist system.
Eventually, m ost debates about the allocation o f econom ic rights boil down to
a question o f eq u ity .29 For exam ple, as taxes are altered, budget priorities are shifted
or regulations added or erased, som e individual or group gains equity and other
individuals or groups lose equity. This is the unavoidable consequence o f zero-sum
gam es. It is alw ays very easy to allocate econom ic gains. The difficulty lies in

29 Lester Thurow , The Zero-Sum Society, 189.
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allocating the loses.30 In a pluralist society, w here groups have the right and the
ability to m obilize, decisions are not made on a purely norm ative rational. It would
appear logical that the groups that m obilize with the m ost pow er, or perhaps the most
intensity, would have the best chance o f avoiding loss allocation.
H istorically, econom ic grow th has m ade these decisions e a s i e r . A s the size
o f the “econom ic pie” has increased econom ic allocation could be altered without
requiring any group to accept a loss. In this scenario, com prom ise and consensus
becom e an easier process. As long as the argum ent revolves around who gets more,
instead of. who gets less, intensity o f participation will be le s s ."
In contrast, to protect our ow n income, we will fight to stop econom ic change
from happening even if the policy change will help im prove the standard o f living for
the m ajority o f the p o p u la ce/

Lester Thurow writes,

The problem w ith zero-sum games is that the essence o f the problem
solving is loss allocation. But this is precisely w hat our political
process is least capable o f doing. W hen there are econom ic gains to
be allocated, our political process can allocate them . W hen there are
large econom ic losses to be allocated, our political process is paralyzed.34
Thurow w ould appear to agree that econom ic rights attract a higher level of
participation than do political rights, although he substitutes the concept intensity for
“m ilitancy.” He argues that m inority groups have learned to use an easily accessible

30 Ibid., 11-15.
31 Ibid., 14.
32 This is not alw ays the case. In the social security debate o f 1994 the issue
was w hether seniors should get a 2% cola or a 5% cola.
33 Ibid., 12.

leeal svstem com bined with a little m ilitancy to delay or paralyze any program that is
detrim ental to their econom ic livelihood. In essence, because economic rights are a
zero-sum gam e and require loss allocation for some group, econom ic rights will,
therefore, attract the participation o f militant groups trying to prevent such a loss.
Such an argum ent may account for the significant increase in the num ber of
registered political action com m ittees over the past 30 years.’6 (See figure 1)
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It m ight be helpful to offer a hypothetical situation to further illustrate the
concept o f intensity caused by zero-sum gam es. A governm ent deciding to set up a
random sobriety check on Friday nights is a political rights issue. There is no rivalry
associated with this act. No segm ent o f the population gains at the expense of
another. It is more a question o f the public's right to privacy versus the public’s right

■5 Ibid.. 12
Jeffery Berry. Interest Group Society (New York: Pantheon Books. 1992).
37.
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to safe roads. The sobriety check will (ideally) apply to all citizens equally. 6
Therefore, there is no zero-sum m entality associated w ith the debate over this issue.
In contrast, a decision to decrease M edicare benefits in order to pay for a capital gain
tax cut could exhibit strong zero-sum argum ents. One segm ent o f the population
(those who own property) w ould gain at the direct expense o f another segm ent o f the
population (the elderly o r sick). The contention is that it is likely that more intensity
w ill be displayed in the later issue that the first. The later exam ple is a zero-sum
situation, the previous one is not.
Some theorists argue that the social acceptance o f zero-sum m entality is the
result o f political isolation. R obert B ellah, a com m unitarian, suggests that
individualism is more m oderate than ram pant egoism , but that the end results are the
same. “Individualism is a calm and considered feeling w hich disposes each citizen to
isolate him self from the m ass o f his fellows and w ith d raw .. .he gladly leaves the
greater society to look out after itself.”37 D eTocquiville envisioned the same
consequences. He w arned that if people becom e too focused on their individual
econom ic needs, they will lose the tendency to look at society’s needs. “Citizens who
are bound to take part in public affairs,” he observed, “m ust turn from private
interests and occasionally take a look at som ething other than them selves.” ’8 If
people do not “turn from private interests,” M ichael Sandel argues that people will
use freedom for the sole purpose o f econom ic self-interest, thus, the republican ideal

36 O f course a social factor such as racism could cause a selective enforcem ent
o f such a policy.
37

A mitai Etzoni. R ights a n d the Common Good: A C om m unitarian
Perspective. (N ew York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995), 42.
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that society should interact to determ ine the “public good” will fade and selfgovernm ent in general will be unable to sustain itself.
The fact that these authors offer such w arnings highlights the im plications of
intense econom ic m inorities acquiring inordinate political power. They are
suggesting the possibility that if society fractures itself into m ultiple intense m inority
econom ic groups, “civic society” as envision by classic republican thinkers, will be
difficult, if not im possible to achieve.

FREE-RIDER PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL RIGHTS

If econom ic rights attract more intensity, then conversely political rights
attract less intensity. H owever, do political rights sim ply attract less intensity because
they are not econom ic rights, or is there som ething fundam ental about political rights
that cause less intensity? One possible explanation is that political rights attract free
riders ju st like voluntary public goods attract free riders.
Those who act as free riders on public goods believe that offering to pay for a
public good does not serves a personal interest. The free rider assumes that the public
good will be produced w hether he contributes to its production or not. Therefore, the
free rider envisions a scenario in which his costs are zero, but his benefits are
positive. The sam e logic can be applied to political rights. If a citizen know s that a
political right, if allocated, will be allocated to everyone in society, and that everyone
will have access to the sam e “am ount” o f the right, such a scenario creates a
disincentive to lobby the governm ent. In fact, it w ould create a disincentive to

38

A lex D eTocquiville, D em ocracy in Am erica,
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participate at any level. The free-rider citizen know s that if others lobby the
governm ent to protect or enforce a right, that enforcem ent will not be lim ited to the
group w ho lobbied or to the group the lobbyists represent.39
Again a hypothetical m ight be helpful. A group o f citizens may m obilize to
lobby the governm ent to reduce the num ber o f arm am ents it maintains. Their
professed goal is to ensure a more peaceful society. A peaceful society is a “political
good” that exhibits characteristics o f a public good. If the m obilized lobbyists are
successful, “peace” will be granted to everyone, not ju st the group that participated in
the political system . Furtherm ore, every citizen will get the sam e “am ount” o f peace.
Therefore, because every citizen knows that the benefits will be distributed to all,
they have a disincentive to participate. W hy w ould they expend personal resources,
such as m oney and tim e, to a cause in which they w ould benefit ju st as much as one
who did expend his or her resources? In other w ords, if “ others” will acquire peace
for my society, w hy should I expend resources for that w hich I can receive for free?
Interestingly, Leon H adar, an international relations theorist, has com e to
sim ilar conclusions. B uchannan and Tullock. in their w ork The Calculus o f C onsent,
argued that the am ount o f resources expended to m obilize interest groups is a direct
function o f the “political profits” such groups expected to receive in return for their
lobbying efforts.40 H adar argues that such a conclusion explains why there is lim ited
dom estic lobbying in the realm o f international relations. Because foreign policy
decisions, in general, affect the entire populace it is hard for individual interest

39 In this sense, ‘lobbyist’ refers to anyone who m akes political dem ands from
the governm ent, not ju st hired or professional lobbyists.
41

H adar, Leon. Q uagm ire. W ashington D.C.: T he Cato Institute, 1992.
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groups to reap "political profits." Thus, he concludes there is less incentive for
groups to m obilize around international issues.
H ow ever, there is another possible explanation for such a lack o f
m obilization.

In m any respects, foreign policy decisions are exam ples o f public

goods. O ther than issues that revolve around foreign aid or international recognition
o f patent rights, few international issues exhibit characteristics o f rivalry. For
instance, recognizing a foreign governm ent, granting m ost favored nation status and
agreeing to arm s lim itations are not issues w hich have a zero-sum incentive structure,
nor are they divisible or excludable “rights.” Therefore, it is equally possible,
contrary to H ad ar’s argum ents, that the reason less participation occurs around
international issues is that it is very easy to be a free-rider with respect to these issues.
One possible exam ple o f this phenom enon is that researchers have noted that
the anti-nuclear w ar effort during the 1980s suffered from a form o f a free-rider
problem . M any o f the people they interview ed expressed opinions that im plied their
level o f participation in the political system w ith respect to nuclear w eapons was
m inim al because they felt “other” activists w ould sufficiently address the issue.
A lthough D ahl suggested that intensity can not be m easured, other political scientists
have argued that “ issue salience” can be an accurate m easure o f intensity and they
argue that issue salience can be m easured em pirically.41 Some political scientists
have done em pirical research to determ ine if a free-rider phenom enon truly exists. In
1989 a series o f studies was conducted on issue salience and anti-nuclear w ar activity.
The study concluded that as issue salience increased so did political participation.
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In a later study, issue salience researchers concluded that there was a direct
-p

.
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connection betw een econom ic issues and higher issue salience. “ In an em pirical
study, they noted that social justice issues attracted far less Political Action
Com m ittee m oney than did econom ic issues. They also noted that econom ic issues
attracted m ore special interest group m obilization than did social justice issues.
M any o f their conclusions support O lson’s contention that small groups w ith a
specific agenda, especially an econom ic agenda, have a high level o f political efficacy
and participate m ore than large groups or groups that have political issues as their
main concern.
A variety o f political scientists have concluded that small groups are often
tim es more effective and intense in their participation than large groups.43 In fact,
Dahl him self, along w ith Edw ard Tufte, recognizes the pow er o f small groups. In
Size and D em ocracy, they argue that small nations have characteristics that allow
them to defeat large nations, not only m ilitarily, but often times econom ically.44
Professor O lson notes the same phenom enon, but w ith respect to interests groups
w ithin a nation as opposed to nations them selves. He states, “The sm aller groups—

41 R obert Berstien. “ Issue position and issue salience,” Political Reasearch
Q uarterly 48, no. 3 (Sept 1995): 479.
42 G eorge Edw ards. “The significance o f issue salience,” A m erican Journal o f
Political Science 39, no. 1 (Feb 1995): 108.
43 Lee Fox and Janet W ard. "Issue salience, perceived efficacy and perceived
risk." Journal o f A pplied Social Psychology 19, no. 10 (July 1989): 805-828.
44 D ahl and Tufte, Size and Dem ocracy, 118-120.
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the privileged and interm ediate groups can often defeat the large groups— the latent
groups— w hich are supposed to prevail in a dem ocracy."45
W hat is interesting to note, and both D ahl and Olson fail to do so. is that every
exam ple either author gave o f small groups overpow ering large groups dealt w ith an
econom ic issue. N either author ever offered an exam ple where a small group
defeated a large group on a political issue. A lthough this is not conclusive p roof that
econom ic rights foster intense m inority activity, it does show that Dahl and others
recognized the relationship between econom ic rights and levels o f intensity and
political participation.
O f course, econom ic issues provide an opportunity for personal gain. That
there is a relationship betw een personal incentive for personal gain is a so well
established that there is no need to develop it here. H ow ever, it is im portant to note
that econom ic issues provide an opportunity for personal gain more than do political
rights. A gain, O lson w rites,
The lobbies o f large econom ic groups are the by-products o f organizations
that have the capacity to m obilize a latent group w ith selective incentives.
The only organizations that have the selective incentives available are those
that (1) have the authority and the capacity to be coercive, or (2) have a
source o f p o sitive inducem ents that they can offer the individuals in the
latent groups.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that sm all groups, w hich tend to be groups
seeking econom ic rights and have a personal incentive for econom ic gain, have a
greater ability to affect the political system because o f the increased levels o f political
participation.

45 Olson, The L o g ic o f Collective Action, 127

CHAPTER 6
D A H L ’S R ESPO N SE
C hapter 5 will exam ine how Dahl would respond to the contention that the
zero-sum nature o f som e rights, prim arily econom ic rights, creates a higher level of
intensity in political participation. By exam ining the w orks o f D ahl, he will be drawn
into a “conversation” w ith respect to the argum ent presented in this p a p e r .1 An
interesting place to begin such a conversation is by exam ining D ah l’s desire to create
a holistic theory o f dem ocracy. Dahl is very consistent, from his early w orks to his
later works, in declaring that he seeks to com bine norm ative and em pirical aspects of
dem ocratic theory.2
As an early advocate o f the behavioral revolution, Dahl w anted to be able to
predict the behavior o f citizens in a dem ocracy by developing better dem ocratic
m odels.3 Just as A nthony D owns and other rational-choice theorist o f the late 1950s
tried to superim pose econom ic theory on dem ocratic theory, much o f D ahl’s work
suggests that he too sought to exam ine econom ic influences on dem ocratic systems.
From his early w ork w ith C harles Lindblom in P olitics, Econom ics and W elfare to his
own w ork in A Preface to Econom ic D em ocracy, he seeks to explain the role o f
econom ic influences w ith respect to voter behavior. Thus, it is likely that D ahl would
support an attem pt to connect econom ic pressures w ith explanations for dem ocratic
behavior.

1 Technique borrow ed from Robert B ellah ’s “Q uest for S e lf ’ in w hich he
entered into a “conversation” with Ralph W. Em erson.
•y

" Dahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 6.
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Indeed, D ahl argues that it was a m istake for dem ocratic theorists to “divorce
neoclassical econom ics and political science."4

He argues that too many econom ists

are disdainful o f political realities for their theories to have practical relevance. At the
sam e time, D ahl also argues that, in general, political scientists are ignorant of
econom ic forces and therefore many o f their analyses are in c o m p lete/ It for this
reason that D ahl rejects form s o f dem ocratic socialism that rely on state ow nership o f
industry. A ccording to Dahl, Politics, Econom ics and Welfare and the introduction of
the term polyarchy was his first attempt to unify free m arket econom ic theory and
political theory. He explains that social dem ocrats are "adm irably com m itted to
ti

political dem ocracy” but their ignorance of "the im portance o f m arkets as a m eans o f
allocating resources” lim its the feasibility of their approach. Therefore, Dahl suggests
that dem ocratic socialism m ust be a m arket-based socialism . Such a conclusion
em phasizes the im portance Dahl places on understanding free m arket econom ic
forces in order to create a com prehensive dem ocratic theory.
If one is to understand the im pact o f free markets on political system s, one
must understand that capitalism is a com petitive system. The com petition results
from the fact that econom ics is the process o f allocating finite resources. A lthough
Dahl does not specifically m ention or analyze econom ic rights from a zero-sum

3 D ahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 51.
4 D ahl, Justifying Democracy, 3.
3 H ow ever, it is a valid argument to suggest M adison was aware o f free
m arkets and their influences on politics. Prim arily his concern with “the unequal
distribution o f w ealth” as cited in Federalist # 10. In addition, political scientists such
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perspective, he seem s to inherently understand that econom ic rights are less
conducive to political consensus than political rights. A lm ost every exam ple Dahl
uses to illustrate deficiencies in m ajoritarian dem ocracy are econom ic exam ples.
Also, most exam ples Dahl uses to ju stify corporatists structures are econom ic
exam ples. Dahl notes that m any critics o f pluralist dem ocracy contend that pluralism
is “a system in w hich private groups w rongfully appropriate public functions. The
main culprits are usually identified as econom ic organizations.”6 He cites the
decision m aking process that determ ined tariff policy in the 1930s and the budgetary
process o f the 1970s as prim e exam ples.7 He argues that a m ajority o f citizens
w anted low er tariffs in the 1930s but individual econom ic interest groups
overw helm ed the C ongress w ith intense lobbying efforts and “distorted the public
agenda.”

He appears to agree with the critics o f pluralism in his adm ission, “Crucial

decisions on econom ic m atters are said to be outside the effective control o f the
national legislature.”9
Dahl also argues that interests groups that lobby for econom ic interests are
more successful that other interest groups.10 He cites specific exam ples such as issue

as Charles Lindblom , A nthony D ow ns and Jam es B uchannan were exam ining the
influences o f m arket capitalism on political systems.
6 Dahl, D ilem m as o f Pluralist D emocracy, 47.
7 Ibid., 45.
8 Ibid., 46.
9 Ibid., 47.
10 Ibid., 66.
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that revolve around wages, prices and investm ents. Their success is typically the
result o f higher levels o f political participation intensity.
Because Dahl understands that intensity o f interest is dangerous to stable
polyarchies and intensity o f interest m ost com m only occurs around econom ic
interests, he generally supports corporatist structures. He states,
Thus as the strength and distinctiveness o f a country’s subcultures
increase, the chances for polyarchy should decline. Subcultures
typically form ed around ethnic, religious, racial or linguistic
differences... and ideology.11
In essence, D ahl is once again arguing that if distinct groups becom e too inw ardly
focused on group accom plishm ents, and gains, pluralism m ight not m ediate societal
tensions w ithout som e type o f corporatists structures. If one adds to D ahl’s list,
econom ic concerns, and often tim es Dahl does, then a clear stream o f logic becom es
obvious. D ahl adm its that pluralism fails in the face o f intense factionalism . He
concludes that in order to avoid civic strife, succession or extra-legal lobbying efforts,
a corporatist system m ust be developed.12 Therefore, if Dahl concedes that political
cleavages, at tim es, require consociationalism , then intense econom ic cleavages m ust
require the sam e solution. H owever, since Dahl identifies econom ic causes o f
gridlock m uch m ore often than political causes, it w ould appear rational to assum e
that Dahl w ould in fact support the contention that econom ic rights, via their zerosum characteristics, have a greater tendency tow ards political system gridlock than
political rights.

11 D ahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 254.
12 Ibid., 257.

Such conclusions lead one to an analysis o f D ah l's m athem atical and graphical
exam ination o f intensity in A Preface to D em ocratic Theory. Dahl discusses a variety
of possibilities w ith respect to agreem ent and disagreem ent sym m etries and
asymmetries. In other w ords, he not only analyzes how peo p le's opinions differ, but
how intensity o f their beliefs may threaten a stable polyarchy. The reason for doing
so is “the com parison o f intensities is im portant [because o f ] a desire to predict the
stability of dem ocratic system and perhaps design rule to ensure its stability." In
Figure 1 he describes a situation in which there is a strong consensus and most of the
intense voters are on one side of the issue. Note that not only are m ost people in favor
o f the im aginary policy, but m ost the intense supporters are on the same side. In such
a situation, political consensus is very likely. B ecause all the intense voters are on
one side, and in the m ajority, they will not be threatened by a m ajoritarian system.
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Source: (Figures I - 6): Robert Dahl. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1954. P p. 9 4 - 1 0 9 .
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At first glance, one m ight argue that such a contention flies in the face of
D ahl's previous argum ent that m ajorities do not rule, but that conglom eration of
m inorities rule. H ow ever, Dahl rem ains consistent if one assum es that the populace
represented at point A is a collection o f m inorities and not one cohesive majority. A
second question a critic o f Dahl m ight pose is: does Figure 1 represent tyranny o f the
m ajority? A lthough D ahl does not expressly address this question in A Preface to
D em ocratic Theory, his later w orks suggest a very M adisonian answer. M ajorities do
form out of several m inorities, but because they are tem porary, they pose only a
lim ited threat to society.
In Figure 2 the situation has changed. In this scenario, a large majority
supports the policy but not w ith any level o f intensity. A lso im portant is the fact that
those who are intensely for or against the policy are small in num ber and equally
divided. A lthough no em pirical research has been done. Figure 2 m ight represent an
issue such as affirm ative action. A m ajority o f people are in favor o f the policy, but
apparently am bivalent about their support. H ow ever, there is also a minority
intensely opposed to such a policy. Such a scenario will also have no adverse effects
on a stable polyarchy. The intense voters are o f such a sm all num ber that even if they
did feel threatened by a m ajoritarian system , they w ould not have the political
num bers to threaten the stability o f the system .
In Figure 2, Dahl ignores a relevant question. Can the intense but small
m inority force a com prom ise w ith the apathetic m ajority? His previous discussions o f
the Civil Rights m ovem ent in the 1960s suggests he thinks they could force
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com prom ise, or at least slow the progress of the apathetic majority. The fact that
Dahl seems to ignore this question highlights a larger criticism . Dahl appears to be
more concerned with stability than any other dem ocratic question. He does not
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address the question, which group will prevail in the type o f conflict presented in
Figure 2 (or any o f the conflicts presented in any o f his charts)? He claimed, that in
studying the role o f intensity, he was trying to predict outcom es in a dem ocratic
system. H owever, w ith this form of analysis, he sim ply is trying to predict the
stability o f dem ocratic system s.
If D ah l’s prim ary concern is with the stability o f dem ocratic systems, he also
fails to answ er an im portant question: why should stability be a valued characteristic?
It could be easily argued that instability is necessary for political change. Dahl, by
focusing on stability, creates a very static view o f politics that im parts some
norm ative value on the status quo. H owever, m ilitary dictatorships and repressive
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totalitarian system s can claim they are stable. These exam ples are antagonistic
towards D ahl’s apparent desire for stability.
Figure 3 represents a situation in w hich the public disagrees about the policy,
but the disagreem ent is sym m etrical. That is. an equal num ber o f people are slightly
for and against the policy and an equal num ber are intensely for and against the
policy. Figure 3 m ight represent an issue such as allow ing gays in the military. A
small group o f m ilitary people are intensely opposed and a sm all group o f gay rights
activists are intensely for the policy. H ow ever, m ost o f the voters are not interested in
such an issue and therefore their preferences are apathetic preferences. W hat is
im portant to D ahl in this situation is that the num ber o f those intensely for and against
the policy are a m inority o f the total voters. The sym m etry o f the votes is different
from Figure 2. The distribution o f voters is not likely to create a consensus, but
because the m ajority o f people w ho disagree about the policy are apathetic in their
desires, the losing side is not going to feel threatened. As a
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result, the losing side will not seek extra legal m eans in which to achieve their goals.
Furtherm ore, the num ber o f intense voters is exactly the sam e as in Figure 2. a small
portion o f the populace. Again, stable polyarchy is m aintained. Figure 3 also
highlights the difference betw een the argum ents o f “young D ahl” w ith the "older
D ahl.” Figure 3 m akes no reference to the possibility that, although the intense
groups are evenly divided, it is possible that one group have more resources to
m obilize. In his later work, Dahl does contend that resource inequalities affect the
outcom e o f situation presented in Figure 3 ( and others).
Figure 4 represents only a slight divergence from the situation in Figure 3. In
this case, there is an asym m etrical disagreem ent. M ore people favor the policy than
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are opposed to it. H ow ever, again, the m ajority o f those for and against it are not
intense about their feelings. Those that are intense represent a m inority o f voters.
A gain, stable polyarchy is maintained.
Figure 5 represents the situation that Dahl fears m ost. In Figure 5. the
populace has a sever and sym m etrical disagreem ent. In this situation the population
is evenly split w ith respect to adopting or rejecting the policy. The danger however,
lies in the fact that those intensely for and against the policy are now the m ajority of
voters. W hether this policy is adopted or rejected, a large am ount o f the population is
going to be intensely disappointed and maybe intensely threatened. W hen such a
situation occurs, D ahl argues that polyarchy becom es inherently unstable.
H istorically, D ahl points to the C ivil W ar. He notes that large num bers o f people
were intensely opposed to slavery and a large num ber o f people were intensely in
favor of slavery. As a result, when Lincoln was elected, the South felt so threatened
they chose succession over acceptance of the electoral vote. Therefore. Dahl
concludes that no constitutional system o f checks and balances will create a stable
polyarchy in all situations. He argues that social hom ogeneity creates stability.
W hat is relevant to this thesis is how Dahl describes situations that lead to a
population that looks like Figure 5. First, Dahl w rites, “Suppose that A prefers jc to y,
B prefers y to x and that the choice excludes [em phasis added] the other.” “W here
each side is large and each regards the victory o f the other as a fundam ental threat to
som e very highly ranked value,” he continues, “it is reasonable to expect serious
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difficulties in the polyarchal system." It is interesting to note that Dahl is
describing a zero-sum situation. Those groups for and against the policy view any
advancem ent by the other side as a direct loss to their side. Every time econom ic
interests com pete w ith one another, they are com peting in the environm ent described
by Dahl in Figure 5. This point is absolutely crucial w ith respect to arguing that Dahl
w ould agree with the concept that the zero-sum nature of econom ic rights leads to an
increase in the intensity o f political participation. Dahl does not argue that intensity
of preferences causes a sym m etrical severe disagreem ent, but that a severe
symmetrical disagreem ent causes higher levels o f intensity. Such a conclusion is
highly com patible w ith the hypothesis o f this thesis.

Therefore, if one w ere to graph the preferences o f the population w ith respect
to the issue o f capital gains tax cu ts13 versus social security cola increases, the graph
w ould look exactly like Figure 5. A com prom ise w ould becom e alm ost im possible
and the losing group, in the long run. is not going to accept the outcom e. M ore likely,
the losing group w ill resort to m ore intense political participation in the next election
cycle. U nfortunately, the social cleavage becom es alm ost perm anent. Just as
elections did not solve the slavery problem o f the 1850s, elections are not likely to
solve intense, sym m etrical disagreem ents over econom ic rights. That is not to argue
that every time there is a conflict over econom ic rights, as described in Figure 5. there
w ill be a civil war. H ow ever, dem ocratic system s can break down in m ore ways than
civil conflict. It could be argued that if an im portant issue is ignored by political
institutions, that is also a breakdow n in the dem ocratic process. For instance, if the
intensity o f political participation surrounding Social Security reform is so intense
that political representatives refuse to address the issue, that also could be a failure in
the dem ocratic system .

Dahl argues that such situations becom e destructive to

polyarchal system s. In fact, Dahl states that such situations described in Figure 5 “lie
outside the capacities o f polyarchy” 14 and therefore can be ignored when discussing
polyarchy.
In “The Ills o f the System ” (1993) Dahl argues that intense lobbying from “the
pursuit o f self and group interests” which are typically econom ic lobbyists, “have

13

In this case, a captial gains tax cut is viewed as an expenditure, not a source
o f revenue.
14 Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 98.

become predom inant in both the practice and language o f A m erican politics. ' L<i

This

result is an increase in political fragm entation that does not facilitate political
integration. He concludes that consensus on econom ic issues is becom ing m ore and
more rare. A lthough one could contend that a consensus on econom ic issues has
rarely existed in any historical period, Dahl identifies the rise o f “corporate
capitalism ” as the point in w hich disconcensus becam e more prom inent.
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H owever, D ahl does argue there is a need to understand how intensities
develop and how they can be m easured because o f situations m odeled in Figure 6. In
Figure 6, Dahl is describing a situation in w hich there is severe but asym m etrical

15 R obert D ahl, “T he Ills of the System ” , 232.

disagreem ent. In this case, the m ajority o f voters for a policy are apathetic in their
preference, but the m inority o f voters opposed to the policy are intense in their
preference. A good exam ple o f an issue represented in Figure 6 is environm ental
legislation. Polls show that, in general, A m ericans support environm ental legislation.
However, there are also sm all groups directly affected by the legislation that are
intensely opposed to such legislation. So opposed that they have sought to change the
rules o f the system to achieve their goals. In the state o f W ashington, it was proposed
by representatives in the w estern part o f the state, (the part m ost affected by
environm ental legislation supported by the eastern m ajority) that the w estern part o f
the state should secede and form a new state o f Lincoln.
Such a situation is also a threat to stable polyarchy according to Dahl. He
concedes that Figure 6 represents a situation in w hich corporatists form s o f
dem ocracy may be necessary. He states,
The rules m ust operate so as to perm it a m inority veto over the majority
only in the cases w here a relatively apathetic m ajority w ould, under pure
m ajoritarian rule, be able to override a relatively m ore intense minority.
A rule m ust be designed to distinguish the case o f sever
asym m etrical disagreem ent from other distributions and perm it a m inority
veto in that case o n ly .16

It is possible that “the rule” D ahl is looking for can be found in collective action
theory and the understanding that political and econom ic rights are subject to different
influences as outlined in C hapter 3.

16 Dahl contend in A Preface to D em ocratic Theory that the m inority veto
should take place “at key stages o f the decision process - in political parties,

In A Preface to Econom ic D em ocracy, D ahl’s m ost extensive work on the
relationship between econom ic and political forces, he seems to understand, without
stating it to the reader, that there is a difference between econom ic and political
rights, as defined in this work. In citing Tocqueville, he notes that political liberty
m ust be allocated in one o f only tw o ways. “Every citizen” he states, “must be put in
possession o f his rights , or rights m ust be granted to no one.” 17 In essence, Dahl is
describing the public good characteristic of non-divisibility. Furtherm ore, he is
attributing such a characteristic to political liberty. Thus, the assertion that political
rights are sim ilar in nature to public goods is not incom patible w ith the theories of
Robert Dahl.
In addition, his understanding o f the lim its o f econom ic liberty are sim ilar to
the concepts illustrated in the characteristic o f rivalry. W hen Dahl speaks of
econom ic rights, he typically refers to property. Dahl confronts the fact that if
econom ic liberty or property rights are absolute, then dem ocracy can never encom pass
all aspects o f society. Therefore, in order to justify the evolution o f dem ocratic
principles in the econom ic arena, Dahl must curtail the belief that property rights are
absolute.
In the process o f analyzing property rights Dahl poses som e questions that
shed light on his understanding o f the characteristics o f econom ic and political rights.

He begins with the assertion, “W hen the claims o f different persons to a scarce [my

elections, legislative activity and judicial control - so that influential m inorities at any
o f theses stages m ay veto the alternative preferred by a m ajority.”
17 Dahl, A Prefcae to Econom ic D em ocracy, 10.
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em phasis] and valued thing are equally valid no p erso n ’s claim is better or worse than
any other’s.” 18 He continues by setting up a division betw een rights that are divisible
or non-divisible. He adds, “ if the thing is appropriately divisible into equal shares,
each equally valid claim ant is entitled to an equal share. ” H ow ever, “if the thing to
be allocated is not appropriately divisible, then each equally valid claim is entitled to
an equal chance to obtain w hat ever is allocated.” 19
D ifferent than this thesis, Dahl sets up the econom ic rights as the non-divisible
rights. He uses as his exam ples o f non-divisible goods a private painting or the
opportunity to speak at a large meeting. However, his logic is very com patible with
this thesis. His argum ent is that the dem ocratic process will have difficulty allocating
the econom ic good because people are unw illing to divide the good. Or, in other
words, there is intense rivalry for the good. As a result, each person understands their
allocation o f the good is at risk from any attem pt to divide the good. The division o f
the good becom es the sam e thing as lim iting the am ount o f the good one expects to
receive.
His logic is m ore clearly revealed by using his public m eeting exam ple. In
this case, everyone has the right to speak. H owever, there is a finite resource
involved. The finite resource is time. Therefore, every speaker view s the other
speaker as a source o f rivalry. Dahl concludes that such a situation can not be
resolved in a substantive w ay by the dem ocratic process. He argues that the

18 Ibid., 58.
19 Ibid., 59.

dem ocratic process will only allow for the equal opportunity to acquire econom ic
rights, but will not allow for the equal division o f econom ic rights. Inherent in this
argum ent is the understanding that econom ic rights, distributed by the dem ocratic
process, will not produce perfect equality. The best the dem ocratic process can
achieve with respect to econom ic rights is equal opportunity to acquire econom ic
rights. If one adds to that concept the understanding that econom ic rights attract a
m ore intense level o f political participation, it becom es clear that Dahl w ould accept
the notion that the distribution o f econom ic rights produces a result sim ilar to the
scenario he sets up in Figure 5.

AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT

In D ahl’s early work, he focused on differing levels o f intensity to explain why
pluralist system s w ere not guided by m ajorities, but m ore typically ruled by groups o f
m inorities. H ow ever, D ahl had a difficult time operationalizing the concept of
intensity. As a result, a student o f D ah l’s w ork can notice an obvious retreat from
using the term in his latter works.
D espite this retreat, Dahl still w anted to defend his pluralist model against its
critics. M any critics o f D ah l’s pluralist m odel argued that the m odel was inaccurate
because it did not account for the fact that 1) not all groups can m obilize to form
politically active groups and 2) not all groups could participate with the sam e am ount
o f influence. Dahl is well aware o f these criticism s, and in general, agrees w ith them.
O ne way to account for differences in influence is to account for differences in
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intensity. H owever, because the m easurem ent and identification o f intensity is so
difficult. Dahl began to use differences in wealth to account for differences in
political influence. One possible reason for the shift is that Dahl openly adm its that it
is easier to em pirically m easure w ealth than intensity. W hatever the reason, such a
m ethodological difference leads a slightly different interpretation o f the causes of
intensity betw een this thesis and Dahl. W hereas this thesis identifies the type o f issue
[econom ic right or political right] as the cause for differing levels o f intensity, Dahl
m ight be m ore likely to identify differences in w ealth am ong the com peting pluralist
groups as the main cause for participation differences.
O f course, such a conclusion by Dahl develops the possibility o f class
differences as an explanation for differing levels o f intensity. Dahl often notes that
m inorities are not always located in a com m on geographic location. Som e m inorities,
especially econom ic m inorities, are dispersed throughout a political unit. M any of
D ah l’s views about how class distinctions cause differing levels o f political
participation can be sum m ed up by M ichael W alzer. W alzer explains,
The corruptions o f A m erican dem ocracy are determ ined by tw o things:
the radically unequal distribution o f w ealth in our society and the
private financing o f political cam paigns. W e can deal with corruption
in two different ways: by radically reducing the inequality and tolerating
the private financing or by tolerating the inequality and banning the use
p
‘>0
o f private money."
•

M ost evidence suggests that Dahl w ould prefer the first option. If Dahl believes that
class distinctions are the prim ary reason for participation intensity differences, then he
w ould be less likely to accept the “issue distinction” hypothesis offered here.

20 M ichael W alzer, “Cam paing Financing: F our V iew s” D issent (Sum m er
1997), 5-11.

117

Political Issues With Zero-Sum Attributes
A nother area o f divergence between this thesis and the opinions o f Robert
Dahl is the fact that he em phasizes the probability that political issues may result in
situations w here a m ajoritarian system can not create political consensus. M any
tim es, Dahl argues that ethnic and social, conflicts create crises that can not be
rem edied through dem ocratic means. He identifies such conflicts as the crises in
Lebanon, N orthern Ireland, Sri Lanka and Spain and the Basque regions as prim e
exam ples.21 A lthough this appears to be contradictory to the hypothesis o f this thesis,
his argum ents are not inconsistent with the application o f collective action theory as a
developed in this paper.
I have argued that one o f the prim ary difference betw een econom ic rights and
political rights is that the form er typically posses the characteristic o f rivalry, or
exhibit zero-sum influences. A lthough this is generally true, there are some political
rights that also exhibit these characteristics. If a political right does exhibit zero-sum
gain characteristics, then it is com pletely possible that a “political intensity” graph,
the graphs Dahl developed in A Preface to D em ocratic Theory and used earlier in this
chapter, w ould look exactly like the graph in Figure 5.
For exam ple, according to the criteria set up in this thesis, abortion would be a
political right. O bviously, the act o f having an abortion is not subject to rivalry.
There is not a national lim it on how m any abortions can be perform ed and, therefore,
one w om an having an abortion does not deter or lim it another w om an from having an

21 Dahl, “D em ocracy, M ajority Rule and G orbachev’s R eferendum ”, 493.

abortion. H ow ever, anyone rem otely aware o f the Am erican political landscape
know s that abortion is an issue that attracts extrem ely high levels o f intensity on both
sides. In fact, if one were to graph intensity levels o f political participation with
respect to abortion, that graph w ould also look exactly like the graph illustrated in
Figure 5. Therefore, such a scenario seem s to produce a conflict with the notion that
only the allocation o f econom ic rights w ill attract high levels o f intensity.
If, how ever, one w ere to argue that som e political rights exhibit the same
characteristics o f econom ic rights, in this case abortion, such a scenario presents less
o f a conflict. A lthough the act o f perform ing an abortion does not create a sense of
rivalry, the political fight over its legality is a strict zero-sum fight. Any increase in
the freedom to have an abortion is seen as a direct loss by those seeking to restrict its
application. C onversely, any restriction on the right to have an abortion is seen as a
direct loss by those seeking to protect the right. The same logic applies to the issues
cited by Dahl.

If the Catholics and Protestants in N orthern Ireland view any

freedom s/rights allocated to one side as a direct loss o f freedom /rights to their side,
then one should expect high levels of intensity w ith respect to political participation,
ju st as if the tw o sides were com peting for econom ic rights w ithin a finite sphere o f
resources.
It is im portant to accept the notion that the dichotom y between econom ic
rights and political rights is a general rule, not an absolute rule. In general, m ost
rights that exhibit zero-sum characteristics are econom ic rights. In general, most
rights that exhibit characteristics o f jointness o f supply are political rights. H owever,
there are som e political rights that have the characteristics o f econom ic rights and
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there are som e econom ic rights that exhibits characteristics o f political rights. A
possible exam ple w ould be a negative externality such as pollution. D um ping
pollution into the ocean is technically an econom ic right. The ocean is finite.
H owever, practically, polluters view the dum ping of pollution into the ocean as a
political right because they are not subject to any real sense o f rivalry.
Therefore, Dahl m ight argue w ith the assertion that only econom ic rights attract high
levels o f intense political participation but he w ould probably be more com fortable
w ith the assertion that, in general, econom ic rights attract m ore intense political
participation. In fact, if one were to count the num ber o f tim es Dahl identifies
econom ic issues as a cause o f political gridlock as opposed to political issues causing
political gridlock, the form er w ould far outnum ber the latter.

CH APTER 7
C O N CLU SIO N
D em ocratic theory is an elusive and m ulti-faceted topic. There are num erous
variables w hich account for different behaviors in dem ocratic societies. This thesis
has tried to exam ine one aspect o f dem ocratic theory in the hopes it may offer a
helpful insight into creating a m ore com prehensive dem ocratic model.
In order to narrow the scope o f the study, only the A m erican form of
dem ocracy was exam ined. N arrow ing the scope even further, it was assum ed that the
philosophies o f Jam es M adison best em bodied the principles o f Am erican dem ocracy.
H owever, one aspect o f those philosophies, intensity, was the prim ary focus.
Therefore, the view s o f R obert Dahl w ere also incorporated into the study. Dahl is
one o f only a few dem ocratic theorists to attem pt to account for differing levels o f
intensity when developing a dem ocratic model. Therefore, the first step o f this study
was to reconcile the views o f Jam es M adison w ith those o f Robert Dahl. In doing so,
a clear picture o f how A m erican dem ocracy w orks on an institutional level (M adison)
and behavioral level (D ahl) w as developed.
Dahl had raised some im portant questions about intensity but failed to answ er
them. He clearly argued that in order to create a com prehensive model o f dem ocracy,
it w ould be necessary to understand how differing levels o f intensity affected the
system. U nfortunately, Dahl becam e frustrated by his attem pts to measure different
levels o f intensity. H e argued that one could identify different levels o f intensity by
observing different behaviors in a political society, but that an em pirical m ethod of
m easuring intensity was beyond the capabilities o f political science. This frustration
caused D ahl to m ove aw ay from trying to explain different levels o f intensity and
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concentrate m ore on differing levels of wealth as an explanation for differing levels
o f political participation.
This thesis attem pted to return to D ahl’s original questions about intensity and
offer a m odel that m ight explain why people exhibit different levels o f intensity with
respect to political participation. Rights were divided into tw o categories, political
rights and econom ic rights. The distinction betw een the tw o types o f rights was
based on criteria econom ists had developed to distinguish betw een public and private
goods. It was concluded that political rights exhibited the same characteristics as
public goods and econom ic rights had the same characteristics as private goods.
Such a distinction lead to the argum ent that because private goods and
econom ic rights w ere subject to rivalry and therefore a zero-sum gain incentive
structure, econom ic rights w ould attract higher levels o f participation than political
rights. Thus, this thesis tried to answ er half o f D ahl’s dilem m a. It explained why
people reacted to different issues with different levels o f intensity in the political
arena, but did not create an em pirical m easuring system for intensity levels. N or was
there an assertion that only econom ic rights attracted increased levels o f intensity.
The criteria rights m ust exhibit in order to attract high levels o f intensity is rivalry. It
was suggested that econom ic rights have a greater tendency to exhibit the
characteristics o f rivalry, but there are certain political rights that also exhibit this
characteristic.
The last step involved postulating how Dahl m ight respond to my hypothesis.
By looking at the w orks o f Dahl, it was concluded that, in general, he w ould likely
accept the notion that econom ic issues are o f a zero-sum nature. In addition,
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econom ic rights, being subject to rivalry, w ould attract higher levels o f intensity.
H owever, it w as also concluded that Dahl w ould probably argue that some political
rights also exhibit zero-sum gain characteristics and therefore could also attract high
levels o f intensity. Furtherm ore, it was concluded that D ahl m ight look to class
distinctions m ore than issue distinctions as a cause for differing levels o f intensity.
H aving draw n these conclusions it is necessary to ask, why is it im portant to
understand the difference betw een econom ic and political rights? And, why is it
im portant to understand the role o f intensity in political participation? M ost
dem ocratic theorists seek to predict the behavior o f individuals in dem ocratic system s
and predict how that behavior w ill affect the overall system . The ability to predict
behavior allow s for the creation o f political structures that will either prom ote
stability, fairness o r som e other criteria the society has placed value upon. In
M adison’s case, he was concerned w ith intense factions so that he could create a
system o f governm ent that w ould protect m inorities and individuals from m ajorities
who would seek to abridge their civil rights. In D ah l’s case, he w anted to understand
the behavior o f intense m inorities and try to develop a strategy to protect intense
m inorities from apathetic m ajorities, and at other tim es, apathetic m ajorities for
intense m inorities.
Furtherm ore, neither Dahl nor M adison devoted m uch of their scholarship to
explaining w hy groups exhibit intensity. M adison dedicates one paragraph in
Federalist # 10 to explaining the causes o f intensity. He cites human nature and
unequal distributions o f wealth. Dahl also offers little to explain why different levels
o f intensity develop. H e too cites unequal distributions o f w ealth as the answer.
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H ow ever, unequal distributions o f w ealth does not explain all intense conflicts. Such
a criteria does not explain the intensity o f conflict in the abortion debate nor in the
inability o f C ongress to deal with Social Security reform. Therefore, some other
explanation m ust be put forth to explain why certain groups act intensely on certain
issues and others do not.
By using the econom ic rights/political rights paradigm , one can predict when
intense conflicts w ill occur. Therefore, depending on the norm ative decisions a
society m akes, that society could develop different m les (other than a sim ple m ajority
rule) when intense conflicts occur. B oth M adison and D ahl agree that in tim es of
intense conflict, som e other m ethod beside m ajority rule should be em ployed to m ake
societal decisions. H ow ever, Dahl is extrem ely vague as to when such an alternate
m ethod should be em ployed. And M adison created a system that was relatively
inflexible w ith respect to using alternative m ethods in intense conflicts. He m andated
tw o-thirds m ajorities for veto overrides, im peachm ents and Constitutional
am endm ents. H ow ever, such an approach m akes no distinction between intense and
non-intense events.
The econom ic rights/political rights paradigm offers an alternative. B ecause
the econom ic rights/political rights paradigm allow s for the prediction o f intense
conflicts, new, non-m ajoritarian rules could be instituted when officials know an
intense conflict will arise.
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